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Discrimination in Chicago in the Streets and in
the Courts
Leonard S. Rubinowitz*1
Michelle Shaw†
ABSTRACT
During the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Montgomery Improvement Association
combined a boycott with a successful constitutional challenge to bus segregation laws,
producing more progress to desegregate the buses than either strategy could have brought
about on its own. The Montgomery Improvement Association’s approach was a paradigm
of the synergy between a social movement and social change litigation.
This Article argues for opportunities for synergy between social movements and
social change litigation in three ways: 1) extending the time frame; 2) joining the forces of
two separate organizations to produce change, unlike the single organization in
Montgomery; and 3) creating an innovative new program that is different from either of
the earlier separate strategies. The Article takes housing desegregation in metropolitan
Chicago as a case study. As a result of close, ongoing collaboration between two
organizations, substantially more low-income Black families in metropolitan Chicago
secured affordable housing of their choice than in the decade before the two organizations
joined forces and produced “delayed synergy.”
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AFTERMATH: A NOTE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF HOUSING “MOBILITY PROGRAMS” AND
PUBLIC HOUSING DESEGREGATION LITIGATION
“Synergy refers to when an interaction of elements produces an effect that
is greater than the effect that would have resulted from simply adding up
the effects of each individual element.”2
INTRODUCTION
Social movements using direct action, such as boycotts and demonstrations, and
social change litigation have often proceeded independently of each other. On occasion,
however, leaders have deployed the two strategies in tandem, hoping to create synergy
between them that results in greater progress than the two could achieve by adding up their
separate efforts.3
The basic model of “synergy” assumes that direct action and complementary
litigation proceed more or less simultaneously and in sync with each other.4 It also
envisions a single autonomous organization making the decision to deploy the two
strategies at once.5 Finally, it contemplates the use of those two strategies in particular
rather than the creation of a third one that represents a more effective alternative.6
The Montgomery Bus Boycott serves as a paradigmatic example of the basic model.
In 1956, the Martin Luther King, Jr.-led Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA)
combined the activism of a social movement and complementary litigation to produce
greater change than either could have accomplished by itself.7 After several months of
boycotting the city’s buses, with increasing resistance by local officials and the bus
company and no visible progress, the MIA decided to add a lawsuit challenging the state
and local bus segregation laws to its strategic arsenal.8 The combination of the two
strategies produced more change on the buses than they could have achieved proceeding
independently of each other.9
The Supreme Court decision striking down those laws gave the Black community
the legal victory it needed, but they still had to contend with the possibility of resistance
on the ground from many quarters that could have turned the Court’s decision into a Pyrrhic
victory.10 The strength, organization, and discipline the Black community developed
2

Synergy, DICTIONARY.COM, https:/www.dictionary.com/browse/synergy (last visited July 28, 2021).
Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and Social Change
Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663 (2005).
4
See generally id.
5
See generally id.
6
See generally id.
7
See generally id.
8
The incredibly long boycott, which lasted more than a year, remained in sync with the lawsuit, where the
Supreme Court struck down the bus segregation laws less than a year after the case was filed. The boycott
and the litigation “interacted, each shaping and reinforcing the other.” See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz,
supra note 3, at 663.
9
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 663.
10
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 687. The
protesters were prepared to deal with opposition that might arise because of the experience they gained and
the lessons they learned from encountering myriad forms of resistance over the months of the boycott.
3
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during the boycott enabled Black residents once again to withstand and overcome the
resistance that arose in the wake of the Supreme Court decision.11 As a result, the
combination of the two strategies produced more change on the buses than either could
have produced by itself.
This Article argues that the potential for synergy between a social movement’s direct
action and social change litigation can extend well beyond that basic model. First and
foremost, it argues that the conditions necessary for synergy can occur long after the
initiation of the direct action and the litigation. The concept of “delayed synergy” suggests
that those conditions may not come together for years.
Second, synergy can occur even with separate organizations and decision makers
proceeding at the same time, each with their own, independent strategies. Even after an
extended period of organizations proceeding on parallel paths, the leaders may come
together and join forces to create synergy. Finally, synergy may be operationalized through
the organizations’ creation of a third, innovative strategy that is more effective than their
previous direct action and litigation strategies.12
This Article illustrates this expanded conception of synergy by using a case study
involving two initiatives that began in Chicago at nearly the same time, each with major
implementation challenges. In 1966, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) went North for the first time, joining forces with local
Chicago activists to address residential racial segregation and discrimination.13 They
launched a nonviolent direct action initiative with marches, demonstrations, and vigils in
July 1966, calling it the Chicago Freedom Movement.14
A few weeks later, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a public housing
desegregation lawsuit in federal court in Chicago.15 It was the first major case of its kind
in the country.16 This lawsuit came to be known as the Gautreaux litigation. It consisted of
“Black” is capitalized whenever it refers to Black people to indicate that Black people, or African
Americans, make up a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, and identity—not
just of a particular color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the culture, as it does with
LatinX, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Litigation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332
n.2 (1988).
11
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 687, 722 n.158.
12
Thanks to Molly Crane for this insight.
13
ALAN B. ANDERSON & GEORGE W. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE: THE BROKEN PROMISE
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO 173 (2008). See infra Part I.B.2. For more on the Chicago
Freedom Movement, see generally JAMES R. RALPH, JR., NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
CHICAGO, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1, 7, 28–91 (1993); THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT
(Mary Lou Finley, Bernard Lafayette Jr., James R. Ralph, Jr. & Pam Smith eds., 2016); ANDERSON &
PICKERING, supra note 13; TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68,
501–22 (2006); CHICAGO 1966: OPEN HOUSING MARCHES, SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, AND OPERATION
BREADBASKET (David J. Garrow ed., 1989); Chicago Campaign (1966), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_chicago_campaign/ (last visited Nov.
15, 2020).
14
See infra Part II.A.1; BRANCH, supra note 13, at 501–22.
15
ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX 48 (2006). For more on the Gautreaux case, see
generally id.; LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES:
FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).
16
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 1–2; see infra Part I.B.2.
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two companion cases challenging policies and practices of the local and federal agencies,
respectively, that administered the public housing program.17
Unlike in Montgomery, the direct action lasted less than three months, but it
culminated in an agreement between the Chicago Freedom Movement and local leaders
that provided for the creation of a successor organization that implemented the
agreement.18 That organization, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open
Communities (Leadership Council), soon opened its doors.19 Also, unlike in Montgomery,
the Gautreaux litigation proceeded slowly, with its life counted in decades rather than
months.20
For a full decade, the activists and lawyers proceeded separately, without any
thoughts of collaboration.21 While there were factors that may have made collaboration
seem logical, there were many valid reasons for this lack of collaboration at the outset.22
The Chicago Freedom Movement’s successor organization, the Leadership Council, made
some progress in assisting Black families’ moves, but the progress was very slow and
relatively minor. The Gautreaux lawyers, while technically victorious in court, made
almost no actual progress on the ground.23
By 1976, internal and external conditions had changed dramatically in ways that
made it possible for synergy and accelerated progress to occur.24 Internally, the two
organizations had newly shared goals and strategies, along with increased capacity to work
together. The external conditions had changed as well. All three branches of the federal
government took steps that laid the groundwork for collaboration.25
With these important changes in conditions, the Gautreaux lawyers and the
Leadership Council joined forces, creating an innovative new strategy to provide expanded
housing opportunities for Black families.26 This newly-created Gautreaux Assisted
Housing Program (Gautreaux Program) launched in 1976 and led to far more success than
17

POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 48. The companion cases (which were ultimately consolidated) had different
lengths, but both lasted for decades. The HUD case (1966–1998) took a decade to define the remedy and
two more decades to implement it. The CHA case (1966–2024) took three years to establish a violation and
issue an order, and more than half a century to implement the many orders. A 2019 settlement agreement
established the remaining goals and had a planned termination date of 2024. See infra Part II.B.1–2. While
the two Gautreaux cases were later consolidated, this Article refers to them as separate cases for purposes
of clarity. They had very different histories and roles in the synergy analysis. Id. For background on public
housing in Chicago generally, see ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING
IN CHICAGO 1940–1960 (1983); DEVEREUX BOWLY, JR., THE POORHOUSE: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN
CHICAGO (2d. ed. 2012); MARTIN MEYERSON & EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (1964); D. BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT
FOR DISASTER, THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC HOUSING (2010).
18
See infra Part II.A.1.
19
See infra Part II.A.2.
20
See infra Part II.B.1–2; BILL MOYER, JOANN MACALLISTER, MARY LOU FINLEY & STEVE SOIFER,
DOING DEMOCRACY (2001) at 80–82 (describing Stage 8: Continuing the Struggle); 122–23, 126, 130–31,
134 (citing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as part of the case study of a civil rights
movement).
21
See infra Part V.A.
22
See infra Part I.
23
See infra Part V.A.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part III.B.
26
See infra Part III.C.
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either group had accomplished on its own.27 It assisted more than 7,000 low-income Black
Chicago families (more than 25,000 people) to move into affordable rental housing
throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.28 The families moved into 120 suburban
communities, and the Program inspired the proliferation of “housing mobility” programs
in cities all over the country.29 The accomplishments of the Gautreaux Program represent
the “delayed synergy” that could not have been imagined when initiatives began in the
streets and the courts of Chicago in the summer of 1966.
Since the concept of time is central to this analysis, this Article’s structure is largely
chronological. It starts with the two initiatives’ almost simultaneous 1966 launches and
ends with the completion of the Gautreaux Program, near the turn of the twenty-first
century. In between, circumstances changed, creating opportunities for collaboration and
synergy.
Part I focuses on the question of possible initial collaboration and the separate paths
that the two initiatives took for years. Section A examines the conditions that seemed
favorable for collaboration, which turned out to have little force: 1) common general goals;
2) common geographical focus and launch time; 3) common challenges and adversaries;
and 4) overlapping participants.
Section B explores the reasons why collaboration did not happen at that time. The
organizations had: 1) different core strategic commitments; 2) full plates; and 3) different
specific housing emphases (private housing v. public housing), which led to the pursuit of
separate paths. In addition, conditions external to the organizations that were necessary for
a successful collaboration did not come together for a decade.
Part II traces the organizations’ pursuit of separate paths from 1966 to 1976,
including 1) the development of the Chicago Freedom Movement’s successor organization,
the Leadership Council, and 2) the course of the Gautreaux litigation, with the violation
and remedy in the CHA case and the companion case against HUD.
Part III considers the changing context in the ten-year period that laid the groundwork
for the 1976 collaboration. Section A explores the organizations’ altered internal positions
that put them on the same page: 1) a newly shared expanded focus from addressing housing
issues in the city of Chicago to the entire six-county metropolitan area; 2) a common target
of securing access to private subsidized housing; and 3) the growth in capacity of each
organization, enabling them to design and implement a new initiative to advance the
converging geographical and programmatic goals.
Section B looks at changed external conditions that laid the groundwork for
collaboration. These include 1) Congress’s enactment of the Section 8 rent subsidy
Program (1974); 2) decisions culminating in the Supreme Court permitting a metropolitanwide remedy, a necessary condition for creating the collaboration (1976); and 3) HUD’s
agreement to fund a metropolitan-wide remedial rental program (1976).
Section C focuses on the final internal factor: the Leadership Council’s agreement to
administer the Gautreaux Program. That bringing together of the two organizations was the
final piece that created the opportunity for synergy.

27

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B; POLIKOFF supra note 15, at 248.
29
See infra Part V, Aftermath.
28
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Part IV considers the implementation of the Gautreaux Program, including
opportunities and constraints related to 1) demand for the program; and 2) supply of
available housing.
Part V examines the results and measures the synergy by examining the total number
of moves achieved during: 1) 1966–1976 at a time of separate paths; and 2) 1976–1998 at
a time of collaboration. It documents the synergy achieved with the coming together of the
Gautreaux case and the social movement on a metropolitan-wide housing effort. While the
Gautreaux Program faced many obstacles, the scale of this collaborative undertaking far
exceeded the progress of the separate initiatives up to that point.
The Conclusion considers what the Chicago case study offers to the understanding
of the relationship between social movements and related litigation. The Aftermath
highlights the Gautreaux Program’s broader impact in spawning both federal and local
housing “mobility” programs.
I.

THE COLLABORATION QUESTION: THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE
GAUTREAUX LITIGATION

The 1955–56 Montgomery Bus Boycott was a paradigmatic example of synergy
between the social movement and the litigation challenging the bus segregation laws.30
However, unlike the 1966 Chicago situation, a single protest organization coordinated the
social and legal movements.31 When the boycott began, the leaders formed the
Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), to carry out the protest and make the
strategic decisions.32
In Chicago, in 1966, there were two separate initiatives, so setting agendas and
deciding strategies were in the hands of two independent organizations: the Chicago
Freedom Movement and the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU).33 As a
result, any coordination of strategies between the two would have required the respective
organizations to join forces. Their autonomy is critical to examining their possibilities for
collaboration.
This section examines the seemingly favorable conditions for collaboration between
the activists and the litigators and the obstacles that ensured it did not happen at the outset.
Over the next decade, changes both within the orgnizations and external conditions
dramatically altered the calculus.34

30

Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 666.
Id. at 674.
32
While the leaders sometimes disagreed with each other, including about the timing of filing the
desegregation lawsuit, the Montgomery Improvement Association proved capable of working out those
differences internally. While Dr. King and the other leaders considered embarking on a bus boycott and
federal litigation challenging bus segregation laws simultaneously, they started the boycott and put off the
lawsuit. Several months later, events led the leaders to add the lawsuit to their strategy. Id. at 672–75, 679,
681–84, 699–701. See also MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1958); HENRY
HAMPTON AND STEVE FAYER, AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); J. Mills
Thornton III, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956, 67 ALA. L. REV. 40
(2014).
33
See infra Part I.B.
34
See infra Part III.
31
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A. Favorable Conditions for Collaboration
There were several conditions that pointed towards the two organizations working
together from the start. They both wanted to end residential segregation in Chicago. They
both launched in Chicago within weeks of each other. Both organizations were dealing
with a huge and complex challenge, partially focused on fighting the city’s power structure.
Finally, there were many individuals, and even organizations, that were involved in both
struggles, which could have led the way for communication and even collaboration from
the start.
1. Common Goals
The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Gautreaux litigation shared a common
goal—alleviating Chicago’s pervasive racial residential segregation and the discrimination
that produced and sustained it.35 They both envisioned Black people having the choice to
live freely in any housing and any neighborhood in the city—not just in theory but in
reality.36
Both the Chicago Freedom Movement and the ACLU identified racial residential
discrimination and segregation as a core civil rights problem in Chicago.37 Both
organizations focused on the historic and continuing exclusion of Black Chicagoans from
white neighborhoods.38 Because of both public and private racially discriminatory policies
and practices, Chicago had long been one of the most segregated cities in the country.39
From early in the twentieth century, racial discrimination pervaded the city’s private
housing market.40 The result was that Black residents were confined to overcrowded, over-

35

See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13; POLIKOFF, supra note 15. For more on the Chicago
Freedom Movement, see generally RALPH, supra note 13; THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note
13; BRANCH, supra note 13; CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13; KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13. For
more on the Gautreaux case, see generally RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15.
36
The Chicago Freedom Movement had embarked earlier on an “End the Slums” campaign which
addressed the deteriorated conditions in inner city Black neighborhoods, but with the launch of the “Open
City” campaign, the priority shifted to making locational choice a reality. THE CHICAGO FREEDOM
MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 44–45.
37
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 7; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 201.
38
HIRSCH, supra note 17; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 26–32. The movement emphasized the role of the
real estate industry, especially the Chicago Real Estate Board, that forced Black residents into limited
neighborhoods. ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 291 (1987); RALPH, supra note 13, at 101, 228.
39
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 72 (1998) (discussing Chicago as one of the most segregated cities in the country). For
extensive empirical analysis of residential segregation in Chicago, see KARL E. TAEUBER & ALMA F.
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965); OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN & BEVERLY DUNCAN, THE NEGRO
POPULATION OF CHICAGO (1957). For more recent discussions, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF
LAW (2017); RICHARD H. SANDER, YANA A. KUCHEVA & JONATHAN M. ZASLOFF, MOVING TOWARD
INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING (2018).
40
See generally ALLAN SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF THE NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920 (1969);
ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN
CITY (1993).
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priced, substandard housing—first on the city’s South Side and later in West Side
neighborhoods as well.41
2. Common Place and Time
Both initiatives chose the city of Chicago as the site for their efforts. The several
dozen organizations in the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO)
targeted issues in the city.42 CCCO was formed to protest segregation and unequal
treatment in Chicago Public Schools.43 The organization had grown frustrated with its lack
of success, and it was looking to shift its focus.44 CCCO leaders sought Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s assistance to energize their lagging efforts.45 Dr. King and the SCLC joined
them to form the Chicago Freedom Movement, focusing on the city of Chicago.46
The Gautreaux litigation also focused within the city limits where the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) operated.47 All of CHA’s public housing was within the city.48
The plaintiff class members, who were all the residents of public housing and families on
the waiting list, were all city residents.49

41

FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 38, at 280–81; THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 27;
HIRSCH, supra note 17, at 8.
42
Though still relatively new, by 1964 CCCO member organizations were a diverse array of civil rights,
religious, professional, labor, and community groups. The groups ranged from conservative groups, such as
the Chicago Urban League (who according to its charter could not be a protest organization), to moderate
groups, and an aggressive wing led by Chicago branches of CORE and SNCC. RALPH, supra note 13, at 9,
24. Al Raby was a Black activist and the leader of the CCCO. In the summer of 1965, he led a direct action
movement against the segregation in Chicago Public schools, and their superintendent. Id. at 7–9;
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 35–36. The groups and the individual leaders in CCCO were racially
integrated, and therefore the Chicago Freedom Movement as a whole was a racially integrated movement.
To give the reader a better idea of the integrated nature of the movement, as people involved in the
movement are discussed, the footnotes will identify the race of the individuals.
43
To address separate and unequal schools, activists engaged in many marches, as well as two major oneday boycotts of the schools. The first occurred in October 1963 and involved more than 225,000 Black
children. The second took place in February 1964, with 175,000 Black children participating. THE
CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 17.
44
All of their efforts were to no avail. The resulting frustrations led to the efforts to bring Dr. King and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference to Chicago to support and strengthen activists’ efforts. RALPH,
supra note 13, at 38; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 167.
45
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 108; RALPH, supra note 13, at 28.
46
In the summer of 1965, as Dr. King explored northern cities as possible destinations for his first northern
movement, his focus was on the city itself, rather than the region. The presence of Mayor Richard J. Daley
served as an attraction because he had supported the southern civil rights movement. Dr. King was also
impressed with the level of community activism in the city, as evidenced by the coalition of organizations
that comprised CCCO. RALPH, supra note 13, at 39; BRANCH, supra note 13, at 320–21; ANDERSON &
PICKERING, supra note 13, at 183; CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 24, 241. The
coincidence of place continued as both initiatives expanded to a metropolitan focus later. See infra Part
III.A.1.a.
47
See infra Part II.B.1. See also Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Metropolitan Public Housing Desegregation
Remedies: Chicago’s Privatization Program, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 595–96 (1992).
48
See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 29–30.
49
Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Under state law, CHA could provide
public housing in the suburbs, with the approval of local officials. That had not happened, so there were no
CHA residents living in the suburbs. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
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The fact that both initiatives started at almost the same time also seemed to provide
an opportunity for collaboration.50 After months of preparation, in the summer of 1966, the
Chicago Freedom Movement and the ACLU launched the “open city” movement and filed
the Gautreaux case, respectively.51
During this period, civil rights movements in the streets, inspired by Montgomery,
and actions in the courts, inspired by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, took place all over the country.52 Given this high level of civil rights
activity, it was not particularly surprising that both initiatives launched in the same place
around the same time, even though they did so independently. Chicago had such an extreme
history of segregation and discrimination in all aspects of the city’s housing that both the
initiatives were quite timely.53
3. Common Challenges and Adversaries
Both initiatives entered uncharted territory, with high risks and great uncertainty as
to the outcome.54 The Chicago Freedom Movement was Dr. King’s and the SCLC’s first
foray into the North.55 Chicago was a much larger and more complex city than any southern
campaign had addressed.56 The Gautreaux case was the first major lawsuit alleging racial
discrimination in a northern public housing program.57 Similarly, the ACLU was
challenging the administration of one of the largest public housing programs in the
country.58
The development of the ACLU’s and Chicago Freedom Movement’s strategies to challenge the city’s
racial divide spanned essentially the same time period. ACLU lawyers spent months examining the facts of
public housing segregation, researching the law, and developing legal theories of the case. Meanwhile,
Chicago Freedom Movement leadership considered various possible focuses, strategies, and tactics, before
settling on open housing as the centerpiece of the movement. During that period of preparation, each
organization could have explored the potential benefits and costs of collaboration. See infra Part I.B.2.
51
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13 at 45–48; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 48.
52
See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 13; The Civil Rights Movement Timeline, HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/civil-rights-movement/civil-rights-movement-timeline (Dec. 4, 2017,
updated Jan. 19, 2021).
53
See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 17; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39.
54
Arguably this could also be a reason for not coordinating, since it would make things more complicated.
See infra Part I.B.2.
55
See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13. For more on the Chicago Freedom Movement, see
generally RALPH, supra note 13; THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13; BRANCH, supra note
13; GARROW, supra note 13; KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13. For information on the civil rights
movement in the north, see generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2009); JEANNE THEOHARIS, A MORE BEAUTIFUL AND
TERRIBLE HISTORY: THE USES AND MISUSES OF CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY (2018); MARTHA BIONDI, TO
STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2006).
56
See infra Part I.B.2.
57
See infra Part II.B.1. In 1953, a California appeals court found that a policy to deny Black tenants
admission to buildings in white neighborhoods was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 30.
58
In the 1950s, CHA was the largest landlord in Chicago, with over 40,000 units. As of 2021, CHA was the
second largest housing authority in the United States based on number of Section 8 vouchers, and third
based on public housing units. About, CHI. HOUS. AUTH., https://www.thecha.org/about (last visited Nov. 1,
2021); Donna Kimura, Top Public Housing Authorities, HOUS. FIN. (Apr. 1, 2010),
https://www.housingfinance.com/developments/top-public-housing-authorities_o.
50
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Moreover, both the Chicago Freedom Movement and the ACLU confronted the
city’s power structure.59 The powerful Mayor Richard J. Daley, the local Democratic
machine, and its many allies presented a formidable force that was likely to strenuously
oppose any efforts at systematic change in the policies and practices that had produced the
city’s residential patterns.60
4. Overlapping Participants
In general, direct action and litigation call for different kinds of participants, with the
former requiring activist leaders and many “foot soldiers” without any specialized
knowledge and the latter relying on a small number of lawyers with specific expertise.61
However, in this instance, some organizations and individuals participated in both
initiatives. Those connections seemed to provide an opportunity for collaboration.
The non-profit Chicago Urban League appeared to be a potential bridge between the
Chicago Freedom Movement and the public housing litigation.62 It had long served the
city’s Black community in helping people “find jobs, secure affordable housing, enhance
their educational experiences, and grow their businesses.”63 The Urban League participated
in the Chicago Freedom Movement as a member of CCCO.64 Bill Berry, its Executive
Director, played an important role throughout the direct action campaign and beyond, while

59

The city government was not the primary formal opposition for either the Chicago Freedom Movement
or the Gautreaux case; but with Mayor Richard J. Daley (white) at the peak of his power in running the
Democratic machine, he and his allies in City Hall and at CHA were among the main opponents for both
the Chicago Freedom Movement and the Gautreaux litigators. For more on Mayor Daley’s role in Chicago,
see, e.g., ADAM COHEN & ELIZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH: MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY - HIS
BATTLE FOR CHICAGO AND THE NATION (2000); MIKE ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO
(1998); ROGER BILES, RICHARD J. DALEY: POLITICS, RACE, AND THE GOVERNING OF CHICAGO (1995).
60
See infra Part II.A.2, II.B.1. At the summit meetings with the Chicago Freedom Movement, Daley was
the dominant figure, using his clout to leverage a deal that ended the marches. See infra Part II.A.1.
In the public housing litigation, Mayor Daley’s role was less visible, because CHA was a separate legal
entity and the only local defendant in the case; but everyone knew that he was pulling the strings there as
well. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 77, 79, 98–99; COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 199–201.
The formal head and public face of CHA was its chairman Charles Swibel (white), who was the mayor’s
surrogate, confidante, close adviser, and his appointee to the position. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 42–43.
During the summit meetings, Swibel tried to persuade the Chicago Freedom Movement to get the
Gautreaux lawyers to drop the case as part of the agreement. John McKnight, The Summit Negotiations:
Chicago, August 17, 1966, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 117–18. Ironically, Swibel was either
assuming a connection between the Chicago Freedom Movement and the lawyers in the case or trying to
stimulate such a connection in order to achieve his purpose of making the lawsuit go away.
61
Leonard S. Rubinowitz et. al., A “Notorious Litigant” and “Frequenter of Jails”: Martin Luther King,
Jr., His Lawyers, and the Legal System, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 496, 568 (2016).
62
The Urban League even played a role in SCLC coming to Chicago. An Urban League study found that
there were large numbers of Black people from Mississippi living in Chicago. That helped the SCLC
conclude that there would be a natural connection between Dr. King and Chicago’s Black community.
Presentation by Bernard Lafayette at the Gary Orfield conference in 1987; see generally ARVARH E.
STRICKLAND, HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO URBAN LEAGUE (University of Missouri Press rev. ed. 2001).
63
About, CHI. URB. LEAGUE, https://chiul.org/about/ (last visited July 28, 2021). The Chicago Urban
League was founded in 1916 as an affiliate of the National Urban League.
64
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 99. The Chicago Urban League had been a member of CCCO
since its formation in 1962. Id. at 90.
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Harold (Hal) Baron, its Research Director, played a central role in drafting the document
that guided the movement—the “Program of the Chicago Freedom Movement.”65
At the same time, the Urban League laid the essential groundwork for the Gautreaux
66
case. Hal Baron led the organization’s research on CHA’s racial practices.67 The work
revealed what appeared to be widespread discrimination and segregation in the location of
public housing developments and the assignment of tenants.68 Baron took their findings to
the ACLU to explore the possibility of litigation challenging the agency’s practices.69
Even though the national ACLU’s history and core purpose were civil liberties and
the protection of the First Amendment, there were strong reasons for turning to it for legal
support.70 First, local affiliates had a great deal of autonomy, and the Illinois division
65

See infra Part II.A.1. (discussing summit meetings, where Ming represented the Chicago Freedom
Movement). Hal Baron (white) served as Research Director at the Urban League. RALPH, supra note 13, at
274 n.17. The program laid out what the movement saw as the largest problems affecting Black people in
Chicago (racism, slums, and ghettoes), as well as listing their demands related to each of those areas.
Document available at https://www.crmvet.org/docs/66_cfm_program-july.pdf.
At a meeting on July 23, 1966, Baron informed the Chicago Freedom Movement leadership that the ACLU
was suing the CHA over the location of new public housing sites. ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13,
at 218–19.
66
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 7, 26–27.
67
Id. at 26–27.
68
Id. at 56–58. The first use of the research findings was an administrative complaint filed with HUD. See
Frederick Aaron Lazin, Public Housing in Chicago, 1963–1971, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority:
A Case Study of the Co-Optation of a Federal Agency by Its Local Constituency 134–38 (March, 1973)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with first author).
The Urban League provided data showing that since 1954, CHA built 0.6% of regular public housing in
white or mixed neighborhoods and 99.4% of its units in non-white neighborhoods. Id. at 50–51. After
Baron conducted his research and found evidence of CHA discrimination, he joined with the West Side
Federation to file an administrative complaint with HUD. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 7.
HUD rejected the complaint because most Black applicants expressed a preference for Black
neighborhoods. Also, the City Council, which had veto power under state laws, had rejected white-area
sites CHA proposed. Id. at 7, 26–27. It still got some public attention, at least in CCCO-affiliated
organizations.
69
The case did not follow the typical pattern of prospective clients seeking legal representation.
Baron presented his findings to the ACLU, suggesting at the time, “you might want to look at this as a suit
under the ’64 Civil Rights Act.” LAZIN, supra note 68, at 138. An ACLU attorney and Hal Baron then
asked to meet with Alex Polikoff, an ACLU volunteer lawyer, to discuss a possible lawsuit growing out of
his findings. When Polikoff decided to file suit, he asked Baron and the Urban League to help him find
plaintiffs. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 7, 32–33.
While the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause already provided the basis for a challenge to
racial discrimination in the public housing program, the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prompted the
Chicago Urban League’s additional research on the racial aspects of the Chicago Housing Authority’s
policies and practices. See id. at 7, 26–27.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited racial discrimination in programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance, which included public housing programs. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4).
70
For information on the ACLU’s strong history on protecting the First Amendment, see generally DIANE
GAREY, DEFENDING EVERYBODY: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1998); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICAN LIBERTIES (1990).

12

Vol. 17:2]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Michelle Shaw

pursued civil rights goals as a secondary agenda.71 Moreover, it was the only established
legal organization in the city that assumed the costs of its litigation and had the capacity,
through its “cooperating attorneys,” to carry out a challenge of this scale.72 While Chicago
law firms were beginning to incorporate pro bono in their respective cultures, there was no
firm that was publicly committed to pro bono at a level that would have attracted the Urban
League’s attention.73
Based on the Urban League’s research, the ACLU lawyers decided to proceed in
federal district court.74 The Urban League continued to assist the lawyers as they prepared
for, and proceeded with, the litigation.75 Without the Urban League’s efforts, there would
have been no such legal challenge at that time.
Among the individuals involved in both initiatives, Dorothy Gautreaux stands out.76
She lived in public housing for many years, and was a very active organizer of, and
advocate for, public housing tenants.77 She represented public housing residents in CCCO
and in the Chicago Freedom Movement.78 She also agreed to serve as a named plaintiff in
the ACLU’s class action lawsuit.79 When the lawyers made hers the first name on the
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 5–7 (discussing Polikoff’s school desegregation case in Waukegan and the
ACLU’s Civil Rights Committee).
72
The Chicago Urban League did not have resources to fund litigation. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at
257–59. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), the leading civil rights litigation organization in the
country, was based in New York and focused its work on the South during that time. JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1994). The Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law, was not formed until
1969, three years after the litigation began. Mission, Values & History, CHICAGO LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www.clccrul.org/mission-values-history.
71

Outside of non-profit organizations, there were no viable options. Very few Chicago law firms had pro
bono policies and support at this time. Potentially, a member of the Black bar may have been interested in
the case, but their numbers were small, and most could not afford to take a case of this magnitude pro bono.
One of the most active civil rights lawyers, Bob Ming, was closely connected to Mayor Daley, and actually
argued on behalf of the city of Chicago against the Chicago Freedom Movement. See infra Part II.A.1.
73
See infra Part I.B.2.
74
The ACLU is a national non-partisan non-profit, with largely autonomous local chapters. The Illinois
chapter was founded in 1926 and was very small. In 1965, it had a staff of four, and a budget of less than
$50,000. The organization chooses cases, but most of the litigation is carried out by “cooperating
attorneys.” The ACLU is reactive in its litigation efforts, identifying problems and addressing them, rather
than initiating proactive campaigns like the Legal Defense Fund’s school desegregation campaign,
culminating in Brown v. Board of Ed. About Us, ACLU ILL., https://www.aclu-il.org/en/about/about-us
(last visited Jul. 28, 2021); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 212–15, 219 n.43, 221–24 (1976); Ryan Haggerty, Obituary, Jay A. Miller,
1928-2012, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2012 at 2.7.
75
See infra Part I.B.2.
76
See Hal Baron, Women in the Movement II: Dorothy Gautreaux, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT,
supra note 13, at 369–71.
77
Id.
78
Gautreaux was responsible for bringing Dr. King to Altgeld Gardens, her public housing development,
for a rally. Id. at 370.
Dorothy Gautreaux challenged the separate and unequal public schools in the city. She worked on
improving the quality of schools in her area and organized tenants to participate in demonstrations and
boycotts. Id. at 369–71.
79
The Urban League helped find the plaintiffs, and Dorothy Gautreaux was one of six named
representatives in the class action. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 33. Charles Markels, a Lawyers’ Guild
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complaint, Gautreaux became the public face of the residents challenging the agency’s
policies and practices.80
Kale Williams, a white local activist, also participated in both initiatives. As head of
the Chicago Regional Office of the American Friends Service Committee—the Quakers’
social justice arm—Kale Williams was a leader in CCCO.81 He became an important
participant in the Chicago Freedom Movement, serving on the negotiating team in “summit
meetings” that led to the Summit Agreement that also ended the marches and
demonstrations.82
Williams also played a role in the public housing challenge. In the early 1960s, he
worked with a coalition of civil rights groups opposing CHA’s racial policies and
practices.83 In 1966, Williams joined the ACLU board during the initiation of the
Gautreaux case.84
Jay Miller, another white activist who was connected to Kale Williams, also played
a role in both initiatives.85 As a staff member of the American Friends Service Committee,
he helped organize a Dr. King rally in Chicago that attracted 75,000 people in 1964.86 In
the fall of 1965, Miller became Executive Director of the ACLU of Illinois.87 He served in
that capacity when the lawyers filed the case the following summer.88

representative to CCCO and a Gautreaux co-counsel, suggested Dorothy Gautreaux as a potential lead
plaintiff. Gautreaux’s name was chosen to be first (which a case is usually known by) both because it is
unusual, and because she “was a tenant leader who would become an especially good spokesperson.” Id. at
47; see also Baron, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 370.
80
Baron, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 370.
81
RALPH, supra note 13, at 136.
82
RALPH, supra note 13, at 161. He also served on the movement’s agenda setting committee. Id. at 118.
83
Various conversations of the first author with Kale Williams. The first author was present in many
meetings about the program and had many conversations with the lawyers and Leadership Council staffers
before and during the two decades of the Gautreaux Program. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Katie Kenny,
“Metropolitan Housing Opportunities for Lower-Income Chicago Families: Report on the Gautreaux
Demonstration Program, Year 1” (Report for Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities by
the Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University [1991]);
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15. At one of these meetings the CHA director admitted they used
a dual intake system to keep segregation. An account of this meeting later helped in the Gautreaux
litigation. Id.
84
Id.; Williams played a critical role in the collaboration a decade later, when he was Executive Director of
the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, the implementing organization. See infra Part
III.C.
85
E-mail from Mary Lou Finley, Professor Emeritus, Antioch University, to first author (Feb. 6, 2012,
03:31 CST).
86
June Rosner, Jay Miller Tribute Page, ACLU ILL. (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/news/jaymiller-tribute-page (“Jay Miller was in charge of the 1964 successful Martin Luther King ‘I care I’ll be
there’ Rally at Soldier Field.”). This rally was a precursor to Dr. King choosing Chicago for his first
northern movement. See supra note 46.
87
Miller retired in 2000, after more than four decades in leadership positions with the ACLU of Illinois,
Northern California, and in the national offices in Washington, D.C. and New York. He spent more than a
quarter of a century as Executive Director of the ACLU of Illinois: 1965–71 and 1978–2000. Haggerty,
supra note 74. Miller served on the staff of the American Friends Service Committee, a member of CCCO,
from 1961 until the fall of 1965. Haggerty, supra note 74; e-mail from Mary Lou Finley, supra note 85.
88
E-mail from Mary Lou Finley, supra note 85.
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While each of these participants had a role in both initiatives, none of them seemed
to imagine connecting the two.89 Not only did the organizations not combine strategies, but
no one seemed to consider communicating plans, or sharing information or resources that
could assist the other. Their perspective seemed to be that these were two separate and
worthwhile activities, each of which called for their separate involvement. It is doubtful
early connection would have borne fruit, given the need for external conditions that could
not have even been imagined in 1966. They emerged over time, and were not fully present
for a decade.90
B. Reasons Why Collaboration Did Not Happen: Missing Conditions
Even though the Chicago Freedom Movement and the ACLU had shared goals,
participants, time, and place, those provided only weak connections, so neither
organization considered the possibility of joining forces when they began their initiatives.91
For important reasons of principle and practicality, the Chicago Freedom Movement and
the Gautreaux litigation went their separate ways.92 Not only were key internal conditions
for joining forces missing, but the external conditions necessary for synergy also lay well
into the future.93
1. Different Core Strategic Commitments
The two organizations had different perspectives on how to bring about social
change. They drew on distinct traditions of Black protest: one of mobilizing large numbers
of protesters to engage in collective direct action, and the other of using the courts to
challenge racist laws, policies, and practices.94
89

Participants did not seem to be conscious of these choices and did not know why they did not coordinate
as they looked back on it decades later. Kale Williams, one of the central figures in the Chicago Freedom
Movement, was baffled about why they had not worked together. Williams knew that Alex Polikoff was
plugging away during the period, but without a lot of interaction or communication with the Chicago
Freedom Movement. Various conversations of the first author with Kale Williams. See supra, note 83.
90
See infra Part III.
91
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 47. In looking back at the origins of the Gautreaux case in 1966, Polikoff
wondered why he and the other lawyers involved did not consider connecting with the Chicago Freedom
Movement to discuss ways to coordinate their efforts. Specifically, he regretted that Gautreaux lawyers did
not try, through shared leaders, to urge the Chicago Freedom Movement to insist on changes from the
CHA, such as not building more ghetto high rises. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 46; Elizabeth Mooney
Interview with Alex Polikoff, in Chicago, Ill. (July 30, 2008) at 10.
92
For the origins of Gautreaux, see generally LAZIN, supra note 68; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 46–47.
For the origins of the Chicago Freedom Movement, see RALPH, supra note 13, at 1, 7, 28–91; ANDERSON &
PICKERING, supra note 13; DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1987); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 38.
93
See infra Part III.
94
The tradition of collective direct action goes back a long way—slave revolts, the underground railroad,
economic boycotts against the early Jim Crow laws, and the March on Washington. See generally ALDON
MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE
(paperback ed. 1986).
Black activists used the courts as early as the 1890s, with the challenge in Plessy v. Ferguson and
proceeding through the first half of the twentieth century and beyond with the NAACP’s and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund’s legal challenges involving school and other forms of segregation. Those lawyers

15

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

The Chicago Freedom Movement and its leadership—especially Dr. King—
emphasized Gandhian nonviolence through mass movements engaged in direct action.95
They shared a deep philosophical and practical commitment to nonviolent direct action.96
SCLC attempted to create civic crises through massive nonviolent protest.97
As a matter of principle, Dr. King favored direct action because it engaged and
energized the community.98 It featured ordinary people seeking to bring about social
change through mass action.99 For him, litigation (especially relying on it exclusively) put

played the primary roles in shaping the legal challenges central to overturning the Jim Crow order and did
not usually engage in mass protest. MORRIS, supra, at 37.
There are some civil rights lawyers who were involved in organizing, and Spottswood Robinson and Oliver
Hill insisted on a showing of community support before they agreed to file suit challenging the segregated
schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia in 1951. MARGARET EDDS, WE FACE THE DAWN: OLIVER HILL,
SPOTTSWOOD ROBINSON, AND THE LEGAL TEAM THAT DISMANTLED JIM CROW 208 (2018).
95
See, e.g., RALPH, supra note 13, at 38–41; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 125–26, 184–85.
96
See, e.g., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 240 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) (“Our
feeling was that [nonviolent direct action], more than any other [method], was the best way to raise the
problems of the Negro people and the injustices of our social order before the court of world opinion, and
to require action.”); RALPH, supra note 13, at 65. For Dr. King, nonviolence was much more than a
strategy. It was a central philosophy, a way of life. THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., VOLUME V,
THRESHOLD OF A NEW DECADE, at 517.
Moreover, Dr. King expressed concern about the cost of litigation, complaining that “to accumulate
resources for legal actions imposes intolerable hardships on the already overburdened.” GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 139 (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 2d ed., 2008).
By 1966, Dr. King had moved away from the use of complementary litigation in support of nonviolent
direct action as the leaders of the Montgomery Bus Boycott had used. See also, Coleman, Nee &
Rubinowitz, supra note 3; Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 581–88.
97
See RALPH, supra note 13, at 31–32, 51, 59, 65. Dr. King articulated his position in his 1963 Letter from
Birmingham Jail: “Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension
that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to
dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.” MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 89
(Beacon Press 2010) (1964); Mary Lou Finley, The Open Housing Marches Chicago Summer ‘66, in
CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 12.
In his July 1966 launch speech in Chicago, Dr. King emphasized that: “Our power does not reside in
Molotov cocktails, rifles, knives, and bricks . . . I am still convinced that nonviolence is a powerful and just
weapon. It cuts without wounding. It is a sword that heals.” RALPH, supra note 13, at 107 (quoting Martin
Luther King, Jr. speech on July 10, 1966).
By 1966, Dr. King had moved from his original idea of “persuasive nonviolence,” relying on moral
persuasion, to “coercive nonviolence,” trying to put so much pressure on the establishment that it had to
respond. The strategies the Chicago Freedom Movement deployed reflected this more aggressive version of
nonviolence. See KING, WHY WE CAN’T WAIT, supra note 97 at 89. He had given up on the “persuasive
nonviolence” that characterized his early years. Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 580–81, 588; Martin Luther
King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?, Address at the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference Convention (Aug. 16, 1967) in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO
FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 96, 137 (Beacon Press 2010) (1968).
98
Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 568.
99
ROSENBERG, supra note 96, at 139–40; Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 568.
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matters into the hands of the elite lawyers and largely excluded the masses from efforts
that affected them directly.100
From a practical standpoint, litigation had several disadvantages. Turning to the
courts usually led to significant delays, putting that strategy out of sync with direct action
initiatives.101 Moreover, litigation is expensive, and deprives much-needed resources from
efforts to mobilize ordinary people.102 Finally, by 1966, Dr. King was skeptical of the
courts’ ability to convert legal victories into changes on the ground.103
In contrast, the ACLU and the Gautreaux lawyers were committed to litigation as
their main strategy to bring about social change.104 While the ACLU was not founded as a
litigation-focused organization, turning to the courts had always been at least one of its
strategies.105 By the 1960s, the ACLU’s legal challenges were central to its vision of how
to bring about social change.106 When the Urban League brought the CHA research to the
ACLU, they framed the problem of state-imposed segregation as a form of racial
discrimination and therefore a legal problem for the courts to address.107 Moreover, ACLU
staff and volunteer lawyers often shared a “fear the streets and favor the courts”

100

See MORRIS, supra note 94, at 123; ROSENBERG, supra note 96, at 140.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 92, at 91–92; Martin Luther King, Jr., Foreword to WILLIAM
M. KUNSTLER, DEEP IN MY HEART, at xxii (William Morrow & Co.1966); ROSENBERG, supra note 96, at
87–88.
102
ROSENBERG, supra note 96; Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 568.
103
See infra text accompanying note 151. Unlike many of the struggles in the South, where Jim Crow laws
prevailed, the Chicago Freedom Movement was not challenging a discriminatory law. Instead, they asked a
single question: “can a Negro walk into a real estate office and be served?” RALPH, supra note 13, at 156.
The Chicago Freedom Movement leaders interpreted any answer other than “yes” to be a failure of political
will, not law. They believed that only the pressure of a mass movement could change that answer. The real
estate industry was made up of many individual businesses. As became apparent subsequently, there was
no way to change all of their practices in one fell swoop. See supra Part III.C.
104
See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 8.
105
SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU, 51–169 (S. Ill.
Univ. Press, 2nd ed., 1999) (1990). At the time of its founding in 1920, there was a focus on non-court
advocacy, primarily in the form of lobbying, publicizing, and using personal connections to influence
officials’ actions. DIANE GAREY, DEFENDING EVERYBODY: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU, 69–70 (1998).
101

By the late 1920s, the ACLU began seeing that courts were increasingly receptive to their mission, and they
shifted their efforts accordingly. WALKER, supra, at 69, JUDY KUTULAS, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM, 1930–1960 31 (2006).
106
See WALKER, supra note 105 at 51–169; Rabin, supra note 74, at 212.
That was the strategy that Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) had deployed
since the 1930s to challenge the constitutionality of state-imposed segregation, most notably in public
education at all levels. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); GREENBERG, supra note
72; MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961 (1994). That campaign culminated in Brown v. Board of Ed., which served as a model for
making civil rights advances through the courts. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107
The foundational course of Marbury v. Madison, providing for judicial review of the constitutionality of
government actions, is a centerpiece of Constitutional Law and lawyers’ legal training. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803). The ACLU and the NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense Fund were
among the earliest organizations to turn to the courts in civil rights and civil liberties matters. See Rabin,
supra note 74. See supra Part I.A.4.
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perspective.108 Direct action seemed dangerous, with risks of violent resistance as had
occurred in the South.109 The results also seemed unpredictable. In short, nonviolent direct
action was not a significant part of the ACLU’s strategic inventory. Relying on the courts
was the organization’s standard way of pursuing social change.
2. Full Plates
Both the Chicago Freedom Movement leaders and the Gautreaux lawyers faced
complicated and difficult challenges as they pursued their separate initiatives. They had
steep learning curves and a great deal of preparation and decision-making to do for many
months before they could go public with their plans in the summer of 1966.110 They each
focused on their own daunting tasks rather than considering possible connections with each
other.111
The Chicago Freedom Movement had an unusually complicated structure. As
mentioned earlier, the organization owed its existence to a marriage of a pre-existing local
coalition, known as CCCO, with Dr. King’s SCLC.112 The entry of SCLC into the Chicago
picture added to ongoing internal tensions.113 CCCO brought a great deal of local
knowledge to the table, while SCLC brought a series of successes in the southern
movements.114 A struggle for decision-making power ensued.115 Local activists often felt
that SCLC staff treated them dismissively, dominating and disrespecting them.116 It took
months to work out those relationships and create a structure that incorporated both the
locals and the newcomers.117 They called it the “Chicago Freedom Movement,” with coleaders Dr. King and Al Raby, the head of CCCO.118
Similarly, determining an agenda and goals was extremely difficult.119 It took a
number of months to reach a resolution.120 That task began with an assessment of the school
desegregation efforts that had occupied CCCO for several years.121 SCLC and CCCO
108

Interview with John McKnight, former Executive Director of ACLU (July 21, 2006). McKnight was the
white Executive Director of the ACLU of Illinois from 1960–62. He is not a lawyer and favors working
with community groups and neighborhood organizations.
109
See, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH supra note 38, at 121–28, 183–86, 242–43 (discussing violence against protesters
in Birmingham, St. Augustine, and Selma).
110
About six months for the Gautreaux lawyers. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 25. Dr. King announced a
plan to come to Chicago in January 1966, though staff were laying groundwork a few months prior to that
announcement. RALPH supra note 13, at 43–44.
111
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 47.
112
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 24–26.
113
RALPH, supra note 13, at 54–55; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 173–74.
114
RALPH, supra note 13, at 48–55; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 182–83.
115
See RALPH, supra note 13, at 139–40; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 172–88; GARROW,
supra note 92, at 467.
116
RALPH, supra note 13, at 54–55, 139–40; GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 92, at 467.
117
RALPH, supra note 13, at 44–55; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 173.
118
RALPH, supra note 13, at 55; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 188.
119
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 1–14.
120
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 2 (describing the preparations that began in Sept. 1965).
121
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 38, at 282–83; Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Kathryn Shelton, Non-Violent
Direct Action and the Legislative Process: The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Federal Fair Housing
Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 663, 672 (2008).
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leaders decided that continuing the seemingly futile campaign against segregated and
unequal education would not be effective.122
Even after they had switched their focus, it took months for them to choose a way
forward.123 The movement first began an effort to “end slums,” which involved organizing
low-income tenants to press their landlords to make repairs.124 That turned out to be a slow,
painstaking process, with no dramatic progress.125 SCLC staff in Chicago were not trained
as community organizers and experienced serious morale problems with a strategy that was
so slow and different from the nonviolent direct action of the southern movements.126
As a result, movement leaders continued to search for an agenda that would serve as
the centerpiece of the Chicago Freedom Movement.127 James Bevel, a confidant of Dr.
King, pressed for housing discrimination to serve that purpose.128 He argued that lack of
full access represented a denial of equal citizenship, which was the foundation of all forms
of racial discrimination.129 It was not until summer approached that Dr. King finalized the
decision to make the goal of an “open city” the centerpiece.130 The leaders then turned to
the difficult task of developing strategies and tactics to address the deeply embedded
barriers standing in the way.131
Still another challenge was building support within the Black community, which
posed a far greater test than it had in the Southern movements.132 Many Black people in
Chicago had an allegiance to the Democratic machine.133 Elected officials, including Black
City Council members, owed their positions to Mayor Daley’s support.134 Political
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 38, at 283. Although Al Raby sought to continue the movement’s efforts
related to public education, Dr. King’s confidant James Bevel insisted that they needed a broader focus to
sustain a mass movement and attack segregation as well. RALPH, supra note 13, at 51.
123
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 1–14.
124
Id. at 3–4.
125
Id. at 5–6.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 6–7.
128
The discussions tied the old and new goals together. Ending the slums by opening the city seemed to be
key to ending segregation. RALPH, supra note 13, at 50–51; Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 7–
8.
122

Black activist James Bevel did not consider housing discrimination the highest priority for Chicago’s Black
community, but he saw it as a way of establishing a level of dignity that was necessary for all kinds of
racial progress. Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 7–8.
William Moyer, a white organizer with CCCO member American Friends Service Committee, influenced
James Bevel. He also argued for housing discrimination as the central focus of the movement. He carried
out extensive research on the issue and found widespread racial discrimination in the housing market in
both the city and the suburbs, providing support for CFM’s interest in a metropolitan approach. RALPH,
supra note 13, at 99–101; see infra Part III.A.1.i.
129
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 7–8. The decision to focus on “open city” also involved a
process of elimination. RALPH, supra note 13, at 101–02 (saying it was “the only feasible proposal
advanced”).
130
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 7; RALPH, supra note 13, at 102. The goal was an open city
in which all places in the city are available to all. They then chose open housing as the first target to
mobilize around. ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 201.
131
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 12–19; RALPH, supra note 13, at 104–05.
132
RALPH, supra note 13, at 76–88.
133
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 38–40; RALPH, supra note 13, at 80–88.
134
See, e.g., RALPH, supra note 13, at 84; COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 213–15, 315, 415, 519–21.
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patronage also contributed to loyalty to the Democratic machine for significant numbers of
Black city employees.135 In addition, some Black clergy openly opposed Dr. King because
of his use of nonviolent direct action or because they viewed him as an outsider meddling
in Chicago’s affairs.136 Facing a large and divided Black community added another layer
of difficulty to the effort to mobilize support for the movement.137
The Gautreaux litigators also faced daunting challenges associated with their
decision to sue both CHA and HUD.138 The ACLU had accepted the case, but they still had
to find lawyers to work on the litigation.139 The ACLU assumed the costs of its litigation
and had the capacity to carry out a challenge of this scale, but only through its “cooperating
attorneys.”140 Finding attorneys to volunteer on the case was not an easy task at a time
when most Chicago law firms provided limited support for pro bono work.141
Local law firm partner Alex Polikoff assumed the leadership in the case, and
assembled a team of pro bono lawyers to join the litigation.142 While Polikoff’s firm
“tolerated” his pro bono because of his stellar work on behalf of their paying clients, he
could not turn to his firm for other lawyers to join him on the case.143 Polikoff used his
personal and professional connections to enlist four other lawyers—the “quintet”—each
135

See, e.g., COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 205, 314–15, 433.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 92, at 460; RALPH, supra note 13, at 77–78.
137
RALPH, supra note 13, at 76–88.
138
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 47–49.
139
The proliferation of non-profit organizations with salaried public interest and civil rights lawyers lay a
few years ahead. Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund soon became a model for legal
organizations that foundations and other funders supported. See Rabin, supra note 74.
140
See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
141
The widespread large firm “culture of commitment” to pro bono work did not emerge for many years
after that. Coincidentally, the first author interviewed at that firm for a summer clerk position in 1967. The
firm was eager to showcase Polikoff to law students interested in pro bono opportunities. The first author
spent that summer at the firm where second chair Milton Shadur was a partner and spent some time on
early work related to the case.
136

See Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2415 (1999); Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV 1 (2004). By the 21st
century, some large Chicago firms had pro bono directors or partners. Teams within the firm sometimes
formed to do class actions. Alan Mills, Exec. Dir., Uptown People’s L. Ctr., Presentation to Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law Students (Feb. 16, 2021).
142
The team consisted of Chuck Markels, a childhood friend who worked with Polikoff on the Waukegan
School Board case; Milton Shadur, a partner in a highly regarded law firm, who would go on to become a
federal district court judge; Bernard Weisberg, a firm lawyer known for his devotion to the ACLU; Merrill
Freed, another firm lawyer who attended law school with Polikoff. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 5–6, 25–26.
All five are white. Id. at 214.
According to lead counsel Polikoff, the Gautreaux litigation was entirely in the hands of the quintet,
without involvement of staff attorneys, starting with the decision to take the case. Id. at 5–8; e-mail from
Alexander Polikoff to first author (Nov. 29, 2020).
In 1970, Polikoff left his law firm to become Executive Director of BPI, a recently formed public interest
law and policy center. Id. at 82. He took the case with him, so it became a BPI case at that point. Id. at 84.
Because the case was in the hands of Polikoff and the rest of the quintet, without the involvement of ACLU
staff attorneys, it was a smooth process for him to take the case to BPI with him when he left his firm. Email from Alexander Polikoff to first author (Nov. 29, 2020). Later, when there were attorneys’ fees from
HUD, BPI split them with the ACLU based on time spent before and after Polikoff moved to BPI. Id.
143
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 6–7.
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from a different firm, who shared a commitment to pursuing civil rights goals on a pro
bono, part-time basis.144 However, they had no preexisting knowledge of either the
depression-era public housing program generally or the specific history of the CHA’s
participation in it.145 The lawyers faced a very steep learning curve concerning the context
before they could address the legal and factual questions in the litigation.146
The quintet’s litigation strategy entered uncharted territory, both in terms of the legal
claims and evidentiary basis for their case. They had to develop a legal theory and the proof
to support it, with few precedents available.147 This was destined to be the first major public
144

Id. at 25–26. Among them, they had litigation experience and pro bono experience, including the
Waukegan school desegregation case and other ACLU cases. Id.
There were dozens of lawyers that worked on the Gautreaux case over the years. The original members of
the quintet left for different reasons over the years, but BPI lawyers and other volunteers worked on the
case throughout. BPI lawyers included Julie Brown, Cecil Butler, Doug Cassel, John Hammell, Bob Jones,
Betsy Lassar, Howard Learner, Patricia Logue, Bob Vollen, and Tim Wright. See POLIKOFF, supra note 15,
at 214–17; infra Part IV.A.
145
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 8. “[T]he public housing program was entirely foreign to me. Chuck
[Markels] was in a similar state of ignorance.” This was a significant gap in their knowledge, since CHA
was landlord to 40,000 families. Id. at 248.
146
Id. at 8.
147
It was only a dozen years after the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Ed. (holding stateimposed segregation in public schools unconstitutional as a form of racial discrimination). Brown v. Board
of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the interim, the Court had decided a series of per curiam cases extending
Brown to many other public services and facilities.
For cases regarding public services, see Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (finding a contempt arrest
for a Black citizen refusing to sit in the Negro section of the courthouse was invalid because the state may
not require segregation at public facilities); Dawson v. Baltimore City, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (affirming a
decision to declare unconstitutional racial segregation by the city of Baltimore and the State of Maryland at
public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (enjoining the city of Atlanta
from segregating municipal golf courses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S.
54 (1958) (enjoining the city of New Orleans from discriminating in public parks).
For integration of dining, see Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963) (overturning the
convictions of ten Black students for criminal trespass while eating at white lunch counters, in violation of
a Birmingham, Alabama, ordinance); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (granting injunctive
relief against discrimination in an airport restaurant, and declaring a Tennessee law requiring segregation of
restaurants unconstitutional); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963) (vacating a conviction of seven
students (both Black and white) for eating at a white-only lunch counter in Durham, North Carolina).
For integration of transit systems, see Gayle v. Browder, supra note 10, (affirming a decision striking down
a segregation law applying to bus transit in Montgomery, Alabama); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31
(1962) (holding that segregated interstate and intrastate transit is unconstitutional); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370
U.S. 154 (1962) (reversing a conviction of breach-of-peace of Black citizens who entered a waiting room at
a Louisiana transit terminal customarily reserved for whites); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (finding
that a Black litigant who rode a segregated Memphis, Tennessee bus once and was threatened with arrest
has an actual controversy in suing against enforcement of the law).
Collectively, the per curiam decisions held that state-imposed segregation, as well as state laws mandating
or enforcing segregation, in places such as buses, dining establishments, public parks, municipal golf
courses, and public beaches is unconstitutional under Brown.
However, these decisions all involved explicit, facial segregation provisions. See supra this note.
Moreover, the cases almost all came from the South, where constitutional provisions, statutes, and local
ordinances mandating segregation were pervasive in the Jim Crow era. See supra this note. None of those
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housing desegregation case.148 The novelty of their case was compounded by the fact that
it was taking place in a northern city, where the case was not based on explicit or “facial”
discrimination, as in the Jim Crow South.149 The case would be one of first impression for
the courts.150
Additionally, without a “smoking gun” proving CHA’s intentional racial
discrimination, the lawyers had to engage in extensive pre-filing discovery, including in-

Supreme Court decisions involved the federal public housing program. The few cases considering racial
discrimination in public housing were lower court ones where the segregation policies were explicit,
leading the court to find them unconstitutional.
Those cases provided little guidance as to how to develop a case challenging the constitutionality of the
public housing program in Chicago. The Illinois constitution did not require or permit segregation in public
housing. It said nothing about racial segregation in public housing; nor was there any statutory mandate at
the state or local level providing for segregation. Moreover, CHA had no explicit policy related to race in
selecting sites for developments or assigning tenants to them. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 26–27. In short,
the Supreme Court had not ruled in any case that presented the situation in Chicago’s public housing
program. There were no clear precedents on which the plaintiffs could draw. Even in the public school
context, the Supreme Court did not decide a northern desegregation case, with no segregation laws, until
1973. In Keyes v. School Dist No. 1, Denver, Co., 414 U.S. 883 (1973), the Court found that actions by the
school board could create an unconstitutionally segregated school district, even without any laws on the
books providing for it. Id. at 189–90. The Gautreaux plaintiffs were essentially arguing for that kind of
approach with respect to public housing, seven years before the Court had recognized it—even if only in
the public school context—in any case from the North.
148
ROSENBERG, supra note 96, at 75. The Supreme Court refused to hear any housing segregation cases
from 1953–1967. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 30–31, 36. Two previous Fifth Circuit public housing cases
had occurred at this time: Cohen v. Public Housing Admin., 257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958) (dismissing a case
for lack of case or controversy, due to lack of proof that plaintiff applied to segregated public housing in
Savannah, Georgia); Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959) (denying an injunction
against urban redevelopment plans that fostered segregation, where no law required segregation). This
leaves for future cases the question of exactly when a government goes from permitting to enforcing
segregation and what responsibility it has to the tenants of public housing.
149
It was also uncertain whether policies or practices related to site selection or tenant assignment that
produced racial segregation could present a viable equal protection claim without a showing of intent to
discriminate. While the initial complaint included both intent and effect counts, Judge Austin dismissed the
effects counts as insufficient to make out a constitutional claim. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 55–56. A
decade later, the Supreme Court required a showing of purposeful discrimination to make out a claim under
the equal protection clause in Washington v. Davis., 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The strongest claim would be
that CHA intentionally carried out a segregated program in locating and occupying its developments.
Because CHA did not have an explicit segregation mandate, plaintiffs would have to prove that CHA
practices intentionally produced the segregation that the plaintiffs claimed existed. Statistics on the location
and occupancy of the family public housing in the city provided only a starting point. Even that was
contested. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 50–58.
Still another evidentiary challenge involved the search for a former CHA employee who played a part in
carrying out the covert segregation practices and was willing to testify about them. That search took
Polikoff to New York, where he spoke with a woman who elaborated on her role in the agency’s racially
driven practices in assigning tenants. Id. at 53.
District Judge Richard Austin’s extremely skeptical initial reaction to the plaintiffs’ claims showed the
challenges lying ahead for the lawyers: “Where do you want them to put ‘em—Lake Shore Drive?” (a
reference to a very affluent location along Lake Michigan). Id. at 49–50.
150
See infra notes 155–56.
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depth research in CHA’s massive and disorganized files.151 The Gautreaux lawyers had
their hands full over the months of preparation for filing the case and the continuing
challenges after that.
Because these organizations were so busy dealing with internal struggles and steep
learning curves, they were likely too preoccupied to even consider adding another factor
into the equation. The addition of another set of people, ideas, and priorities would have
simply been too difficult to manage at this point in time for both the movement activists
and the lawyers.
3. Specific Housing Emphasis: Private Housing v. Public Housing
The history of racial discrimination in Chicago’s housing demonstrates the
relationship between discrimination in the private housing market and the racial policies
and practices in public housing.152 There was a reciprocal relationship between the
segregation in those two parts of the housing supply—site selection for public housing
perpetuated the pre-existing segregation in the private market, and the development of
public housing reinforced the private market discrimination and segregation.153
While the Chicago Freedom Movement activists and the Gautreaux litigators shared
the goal of ending racial discrimination in the city’s housing, they emphasized different
parts of that inter-related system.154 The Chicago Freedom Movement focused on parts of
the private market, while the litigation focused exclusively on the city’s public housing
program.155
At the launch of the Chicago Freedom Movement, Dr. King emphasized the
movement’s private market focus.156 Though they viewed public housing as part of the
151

POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 56. A team of volunteer law firm lawyers working on the case pro bono
engaged in factual and legal research over the next several months. The Urban League also brought
together a team of college students to assist with factual research. The students, known as the “jeans
brigade,” spent a summer searching for evidence of CHA’s discriminatory purpose. Id. at 56–57;
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 242.
152
When the public housing program began in Chicago during the Great Depression, its policies and
practices mirrored the discrimination and segregation of the private market. MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 39, at 17, 21, 31–37. Massey and Denton also note that residential patterns had not always been
segregated in the city. In the nineteenth century, when the city’s Black population was small, Black
residents were relatively dispersed. Segregation began to be pervasive with the first Great Migration of the
early twentieth century, as Black people from the South were confined to an area of the city’s South side.
See generally JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE GREAT
MIGRATION (1989); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, supra note 17.
153
See HIRSCH, supra note 17.
154
See sources cited supra, note 14, 16.
155
RALPH, supra note 13, at 98–102 (discussing Chicago Freedom Movement’s decision to focus on
housing); Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 8–9 (discussing the potential for dramatic direct
action by vigils at real estate offices and marching into white neighborhoods—drama that was less possible
with public housing than the private market).
156
The demands included a “program to increase vastly the supply of low-cost housing on a scattered basis
for both low-and middle-income families.” They also included demands for non-discriminatory housing
listings and mortgage loans, as well as non-housing-related demands in areas like employment and public
aid. Demands Placed on the Door of the Chicago City Hall by Martin Luther King, Jr., July 10, 1966,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/585ef15dc534a5283f3cf7fb/t/587547dfb3db2ba5306be24a/14840811
20374/King%27s+Demands.pdf.
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larger problem, the concept of an “open city” focusing on the city’s private housing served
as the centerpiece of the program.157 After the event, Dr. King and others marched to City
Hall, where they posted a list of demands, including some directed at achieving the “open
city” by ending discrimination by the real estate and lending industries.158 The Chicago
Freedom Movement then began a series of marches, vigils, and demonstrations in workingclass white home ownership neighborhoods designed to challenge residential racial
segregation and discrimination in the city.159
The activists focused on those places because researchers found pervasive
discrimination by real estate brokers in home sales.160 In addition, home ownership served
as a sign of full citizenship, which was being denied to Black people.161
The secondary, interrelated “end the slums” initiative focused on a different part of
the private housing market.162 Because landlords knew that segregation confined Black
families to specific neighborhoods and those families had limited (if any) capacity to
relocate, they let their properties in those neighborhoods deteriorate while maintaining high
rent levels.163 The “end the slums” movement sought to pressure landlords to address those
conditions while protecting activist residents from wholesale evictions.164 While that
initiative did not have the “open city” effort’s visibility or investment of resources, it
The movement focused on the exclusion of Black home seekers from certain neighborhoods—refusals to
sell them homes there. A year later, Black Chicago homebuyers who experienced a different form of racial
discrimination in the private housing market organized to challenge their sellers’ exploitation of them. Real
estate speculators exploited Black home purchasers both in the price and in selling only on contract, with
no availability of mortgages. These contracts meant no equity until the contract was completely paid off,
and “eviction” if they missed one payment. The buyers formed the Contract Buyers League to seek relief
from those sellers. The organizing efforts produced renegotiation of the terms of some of the sales, and also
led to litigation challenging the racial exploitation as a form of racial discrimination. The litigation was
ultimately unsuccessful. See generally, BERYL SETTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE
EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA (2010); Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13; Jeffrey
Michael Fitzgerald, The Contract Buyers League: A Case Study of Interaction between a Social Movement
and the Legal System (1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University).
157
King, Demands Placed on the Door of the Chicago City Hall, supra note 156.
158
Id.
159
RALPH, supra note 13, at 105–40. The tactics also included real estate “testing,” where Black couples
and white ones visited the same real estate office to document the discriminatory treatment the Black
couples encountered. Id. at 114–17. They also held integrated picnics, shopped at white neighborhood
grocery stores, attended white churches, and hosted prayer vigils. Id. at 51.
160
RALPH, supra note 14, at 99–100.
161
Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 14, at 8. The focus on those neighborhoods also may have been
influenced by respectability politics, suggesting that Black people were just as worthy as whites to live in
those neighborhoods. Private market access focused on home-ownership whereas public housing provision
was about poverty and government support. Public housing residents were disproportionately poorer
families, many headed by women. So, they may not have been the most “respectable” Black folks to fight
for on the housing front. On respectability politics in the Civil Rights Movement, see: Devon W. Carbado
& Donald Weise, The Civil Rights Identity of Bayard Rustin. 82(5)Tex. L. Rev. 2004: 1133–96; Randall
Kennedy. Lifting as we climb: A progressive defense of respectability politics. Harper’s Magazine 31
(2015); https://www.npr.org/2009/03/15/101719889/before-rosa-parks-there-was-claudette-colvin.
162
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 14, at 196–98; Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 14, at 4-6.
163
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 14, at 196–98; Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 14, at 3–4.
164
Herman Jenkins, Tenant Unions during the Chicago Freedom Movement: Innovation and Impact, in
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 188–91; Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at
5–6.
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complemented the larger effort in pursuing the goal of a private housing market that served
everyone equally, regardless of race.165
In contrast, the Gautreaux lawyers focused exclusively on Chicago’s public housing
developments.166 That choice followed from their strategic choice of using the courts to
achieve social change. When the Chicago Urban League researchers shared their findings
about CHA’s discrimination with the ACLU, they were particularly aware of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in programs that received
federal funding like public housing.167 Federal courts had also been applying the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to attack racial discrimination in public institutions,
as epitomized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.168
When the ACLU brought the lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in Chicago’s
public housing program, it proceeded on the assumptions that it had a viable legal claim
and success on that claim would lead to significant change on the ground.169 With that
mindset, there was no need to consider joining forces with a mass movement in order to
achieve their purposes.170
As a result of these disconnects, the two initiatives had launches that were almost
simultaneous but completely independent of each other. While both grew out of the civil
rights activities of the period, the precise timing was simply a coincidence rather than a
result of coordination, and it set in motion a pattern of proceeding independently.
II.

THE PURSUIT OF SEPARATE PATHS: 1966–1976

For a decade, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities—the
successor organization to the Chicago Freedom Movement—and the Gautreaux litigation
followed separate paths.171 During that time, they each made limited progress in assisting
Black families to secure housing of their choice.172
A. The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities as the Chicago
Freedom Movement’s Successor
The direct action portion of the Chicago Freedom Movement caused so much
disruption that Mayor Daley and community leaders came to the table to discuss possible
solutions. These meetings concluded with an agreement about future steps to be taken to
address fair housing, including the creation of an organization, the Leadership Council, to
165

Finley, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 5–7; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 14, at 200–01.
See generally POLIKOFF, supra note 16, at 47–49.
167
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
168
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). As of 1966, there was no
federal or Illinois law prohibiting racial discrimination in private housing. Chicago enacted a weak fair
housing ordinance in 1963, with little enforcement authority. Chicago, Ill. Fair Housing Ordinance (Sept.
11, 1963), reprinted in FAIR HOUSING LAWS: SUMMARIES AND TEXT OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL LAWS 250–
53 (Hous. & Home Fin. Agency 1964).
169
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 7.
170
See supra text accompanying note 89.
171
Operation Breadbasket also emerged from the Chicago Freedom Movement, with an emphasis on using
Black purchasing power to leverage increased employment opportunities for Black workers. See Gary
Massoni, Perspectives on Operation Breadbasket, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 179–346.
172
See infra Part V.B.
166
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implement the agreement and work to end housing discrimination in the Chicago area. The
Leadership Council soon began operations, but faced many struggles and difficulties. In its
early years, the programs were largely ineffective.
1. Origins in the 1966 “Summit Agreement”
As the Chicago Freedom Movement’s “open housing” demonstrators marched into
the city’s working-class white neighborhoods to protest racial exclusion, white residents
and their allies greeted them with verbal abuse and violent resistance.173 Chicago police
were on the scene, but they did little to control the angry white crowds.174
As the violence escalated, so did the political cost of the demonstrations for
Chicago’s Mayor Richard J. Daley.175 The confrontations pitted his two principal
constituencies—Black people and working-class white Chicagoans—against each other.176
Stopping the demonstrations became his highest priority.177 As a result, Daley pressured
the movement’s leaders to seek a resolution of their concerns in the conference room rather
than on the streets.178
Without halting the marches, movement leaders agreed to participate in “summit
meetings” in August.179 There were more than sixty participants at these meetings.180 More
than a quarter of them represented the Chicago Freedom Movement.181 The rest came from

173

As the earlier initiatives, such as vigils at real estate offices, seemed to have little impact, movement
leaders escalated their direct action with a series of marches into white working-class neighborhoods. Large
numbers of angry white onlookers responded with increasing violence. RALPH, supra note 13, at 122.
174
In one of the marches, a rock hit Dr. King in the head and knocked him down. After the march, Dr. King
told reporters that he had “never seen so much hatred and hostility on the part of so many people.” Id. at
123.
Racists also damaged protesters’ cars and pushed them into a lagoon. Unlike a few years earlier, in places
like Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, the Chicago police were not the source of the violence against
nonviolent protesters, but they were not effective in providing protection. Their sympathies with the white
residents and their allies were quite apparent. Id. at 120–23.
175
Id. at 141–42.
176
Id.
177
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 232; McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 14, at 112.
178
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 232.
179
RALPH supra note 13, at 151, 158.
180
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, App. I at 439–40.
181
Id.; Martin Luther King and Al Raby led the Chicago Freedom Movement contingent, which was all
men and mostly Black activists. The presence of several whites reflected the inter-racial nature of the
movement. The contingent included local representatives from CCCO and SCLC members from the South.
Dr. King reinforced his commitment to non-violent direct action and his reluctance to rely on legal
remedies in a colloquy with William Ming. Ming had defended Dr. King six years earlier in a perjury trial
in Alabama. Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Perjury Trial: A Potential Turning Point and
a Footnote to History, 5 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 237, 262-3 (2017). In the summit meeting, Ming
served as an advisor to Mayor Daley, encouraging Dr. King to pursue claims of housing discrimination
through the Commission created by the city’s 1963 Fair Housing ordinance. Dr. King reminded Ming that
it was more than a decade since the Supreme Court had decided Brown v. Board of Education, and there
had been almost no desegregation in the public schools of the South. See supra Part II.A.2, II.B.1;
Rubinowitz, supra note 61, at 587; McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 124, 127.
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the city’s elite—business, civic, religious, labor, and government leaders, including Mayor
Daley and his colleagues.182
The tense negotiations culminated in a “Summit Agreement” that a subcommittee
prepared and presented to the participants later that month.183 After substantial debate, a
vote approved the draft with no dissents.184 But it was just that—an agreement about future
steps to be taken to advance open housing in the Chicago metropolitan area, with few
specifics or timetables.185
Sections one through nine listed a series of general commitments by public and
private actors to pursue racially non-discriminatory policies and practices.186 Section ten,
the last, longest, and arguably the most important provision of the Summit Agreement,
made clear that the participants understood that the work had just begun and that major
There were no lawyers among the movement’s representatives at the summit meetings. That reflected the
movement’s strong commitment to direct action and limiting the roles of lawyers.
Several lawyers played a role in various aspects of the movement. While the negotiations were proceeding,
Mayor Daley secured an injunction limiting the number, size, and timing of the demonstrations. Leo Holt,
one of the movement’s lawyers, advised his clients concerning the constitutionality of the injunction.
DEMPSEY J. TRAVIS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK POLITICS, VOLUME 1 392 (1987). Lawyers were also
deeply involved in the landlord-tenant challenges, a different part of the movement. Rubinowitz, supra note
61; Bernardine Dohrn, Gilbert A. Cornfield & Gilbert Feldman, Session V: A Conversation with Gil
Cornfield and Gil Feldman, Cornfield and Feldman; Lawyers for the Chicago Freedom Movement, 1965–
1966, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 667 (2016); Jenkins, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note
13, at 182–206.
182
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, App. I at 439–40. There was also one observer. John
McKnight, the head of the Midwest office of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, took notes on
the meetings and dictated them into a recorder afterward. While this transcript of his dictation uses
quotation marks to indicate someone spoke, it is not verbatim quotations from the participants. McKnight
in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 111–45.
183
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 260–62. The official title was “Agreement of the
Subcommittee to the Conference on Fair Housing Convened by the Chicago Conference on Religion and
Race.” It was submitted by Thomas Ayers, Chair of the subcommittee and approved on August 26, 1966.
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, App. II at 441–46.
During the negotiations, the Chicago Freedom Movement’s representatives did not initially propose that the
agreement provide for the establishment of an organization to implement it. However, the subcommittee
assigned to draft the agreement reached consensus that it should specify that there would be such an
organization. That created the necessity of taking a long view by making the centerpiece of the agreement
the establishment of an organization to carry it out. Significantly, the agreement had no mandate about
assisting individual Black families to obtain opportunities for fair housing, except for the provision of legal
services to those encountering racial discrimination. Id.; RALPH, supra note 13, at 168.
The idea of an entity charged with carrying out the agreement “flowed naturally from the original
demands.” Thomas Ayers, a white corporate CEO, chaired the subcommittee. He expressed support for the
Chicago Freedom Movement at the initial summit meeting. Id.
184
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 262–66. Chicago Freedom Members had significant
concerns about the draft agreement, but Martin Luther King concluded that it was the best deal they could
get, and the others went along with him. When the convenor said to the to the press afterwards that
“through the great democratic process, we have worked out an agreement” one of the Chicago Freedom
Movement representatives responded privately “Democratic Process, shit, it was forced out of them!”
McKnight in CHICAGO 1966, see supra note 13, at 145.
185
The ‘Summit Agreement,’ “Agreement’, Report of the Subcommittee to the Conference on Fair Housing
Convened by the Chicago Conference on Religion and Race, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 147–54.
186
Id.
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challenges lay ahead.187 It made continuity of the effort an explicit provision of the
agreement.188
The section began with a mandate to “initiate forthwith the formation of a separate,
continuing body” to implement the agreement.189 The Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities (Leadership Council) was “established as a direct result” of the
nonviolent direct action campaign.190 It was the only fair housing organization that Dr.
King helped create.191 Its mission was to turn the commitments in the Summit Agreement
into reality.192 There was no ending date for it.193 The indefinite duration of the
organization’s existence underlined the signatories’ recognition of the magnitude of the
task at hand.194
The agreement specified that “this body should accept responsibility for the
execution and action programs necessary to achieve fair housing.”195 The agreement stated
that the new organization should be “sponsored by major leadership organizations in the
Chicago metropolitan area and built on a nucleus of the representatives of the

187

Id.
Id. at 153–54.
189
Id. That organization functioned as the vehicle needed to commence and undertake the much longer
process of turning agreements into changes on the ground and advancing the open housing goals of the
Chicago Freedom Movement. The continuity implicit in that arrangement provides the basis for measuring
the impact of the Chicago Freedom in future decades and characterizing the Leadership Council as a
successor organization.
190
Brian White, The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities: Chicago and Fair Housing,
in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 131–32. Kale Williams, the second executive
director of the Leadership Council, referred to it as a “direct outgrowth” of the campaign. James Ralph, the
leading scholar of the Chicago Freedom Movement, referred to the organization as “the one long-lasting
product of the Summit Agreement.” Assessing the Chicago Freedom Movement, POVERTY & RACE, May–
June 2006, 1, 1.
188

Another commentator said of the Leadership Council that the Chicago Freedom Movement “gave birth to
it.” He also described the organization as being “established as a direct result of the Chicago Freedom
Movement.” White, The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, in THE CHICAGO
FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 131–32.
191
A discussion of Aurie Pennick, CEO of the Leadership Council from 1992–2002 (immediately
following Kale Williams) referred to the Leadership Council that way. This timing included presiding over
the conclusion of the Gautreaux Program in 1998. Pennick, the first Black person and the first woman to
lead the council, was a lawyer with extensive program and administrative experience. See Aurie Pennick
recalls her presidency of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, THE HISTORY
MAKERS, at 4:35 (Sep. 29, 2005), https://www.thehistorymakers.org/biography/aurie-pennick-41.
192
The ‘Summit Agreement,’ in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 147–54.
193
Id. at 153–54.
194
Id.
195
Id. Paragraph 3 incorporated the city’s public housing program into the scope of the ongoing
commitments: “The Chicago Housing Authority will take every action within its power to promote the
objectives of fair housing. It recognizes that heavy concentration of public housing should not again be
built in the City of Chicago. Accordingly, the Chicago Housing Authority has begun activities to improve
the character of public housing, including . . . initiation of a leasing program which places families in the
best available housing without regard to the racial character of the neighborhood in which the leased
facilities are provided. In the future, it will seek scattered sites for public housing . . . .” This public housing
commitment helped set the stage for the collaboration in the form of the Gautreaux Program a decade later.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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organizations” in the summit process.196 This clause ensured that some of the participants
in the summit meetings would play a significant role in the new organization,197 and indeed,
many of the original participants, or others from the same organizations, became early
board members.198
After a unanimous vote in favor of the draft Summit Agreement on August 26, 1966,
Dr. King reminded the participants that the agreement was not an end, but a beginning.199
He expressed the concern that the hopes of Black people had “been shattered too many
times” and that we “must make this agreement work.”200 He emphasized that they had a
“big job” ahead, and that it would be difficult.201
After that, the marches and demonstrations ceased.202 Within a few months, Dr. King
and most of his SCLC colleagues had left Chicago.203 In May 1967, Dr. King returned to
assess progress.204 He announced that he saw no need for further demonstrations in
Chicago.205 That marked the formal end of the Chicago Freedom Movement as an
organization.206 However, the “Summit Agreement” contemplated a continuing impact of

196

The organization was also supposed to develop other strategies and tactics to advance the fair housing
goals. These included holding fair housing conferences in suburban communities, taking steps to educate
the public about their legal obligations, and assisting in drafting of fair housing laws. ANDERSON &
PICKERING, supra note 13, App. II at 445.
With respect to resources, the agreement recognized that “Carrying out these commitments will require
substantial investments of time and money by both private and public bodies . . . [,]” but it had no specifics
about sources and amount of funding for the new organization. Id. at 441–46.
197
Id.
198
White, The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM
MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 136.
Kale Williams provided additional continuity between the direct action and the implementation. After he
played an important role in the summer campaign, he later became the second Executive Director of the
Leadership Council. He held that position for more than two decades. See infra notes 398–99. The first
executive director of the agency was Edward Holmgren (white), a CHA employee during its brief
progressive days during the early 1950s, turned longtime housing integration activist. RALPH, supra note
13, at 207.
199
McKnight in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 144–45.
200
Id. at 145.
201
Id. Dr. King called the Summit Agreement “the first step in a thousand-mile journey, but an important
step.” ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 272.
202
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 59–70. Kale Williams, a participant in the
Summit Meetings, described the situation: “[The] dramatic and intense activity was ended, and most
people, in the movement and in the leadership groups, began to organize for the next phase, that of
implementation of the agreement.” Id. at 62.
203
RALPH, supra note 13, at 223–24; THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 69. Other
leaders, such as Jesse Jackson, remained in Chicago long after that time. RALPH, supra note 13, at 229;
Jesse L. Jackson, Sr., The Movement Didn’t Stop in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at
236–54.
204
RALPH, supra note 13, at 219.
205
Id.
206
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 67–69. CCCO struggled to maintain energy and
purpose, and by the fall of 1967, Al Raby resigned as head of the coalition. RALPH, supra note 13, at 223–
24; THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 69. While other CCCO leaders claimed this was
a time of re-evaluation for the organization, CCCO folded within weeks. RALPH, supra note 13, at 223–24.
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the Chicago Freedom Movement in the form of the Leadership Council as the successor
organization created to pursue its fair housing goals.207
2. The Leadership Council’s Early Days
The Leadership Council opened its doors in December 1966.208 Thus began what
turned out to be a forty-year operation.209 Starting the organization proved a formidable
task, as evidenced by its limited early results.210 It encountered a structural problem at the
outset because the governing board included interests represented in the summit meetings,
ranging from public officials and corporate and real estate leaders to civil rights
supporters.211 The tensions that surfaced in the summit meetings carried over into the
formation of the organization.212 The city’s failure to follow through on some of its
commitments in the Summit Agreement presented still another impediment to the
organization’s early efforts.213
The founders also faced the usual challenges in starting a new organization,
especially one with a vague description and mandate.214 They had to address questions
related to fundraising and staffing, as well as settling on strategies, tactics, and agendas for
their programs and projects.215
All these challenges may have contributed to the failure of an early Leadership
Council initiative. In 1968, the Council launched the Equal Opportunity Housing Service,
a projected three-year program designed to eliminate racial restrictions from the housing
system.216 The organization aimed to secure realtors’ cooperation by providing the service
207

See BILL MOYER & JOANN MCALLISTER, MARY LOU FINLEY, STEVEN SIOFER, DOING DEMOCRACY:
THE MAP MODEL FOR ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2001) for an approach to the many stages of
a social movement. The conception of the phases of the movement is analogous to the lengthy period of
implementation of the remedy in institutional litigation, such as school or housing desegregation cases. See
supra Part II.A.1.
208
BRIAN J. L. BERRY, THE OPEN HOUSING QUESTION: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1966–1976 (1979)
at xx.
209
The Leadership Council closed its doors in 2006, because of administrative issues, including the lack of
continuing financial support. The job was far from complete. White, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM
MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 131.
210
See infra Part V.A.
211
RALPH, supra note 13, at 206–07; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 281–82, 299; White, in
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 137, 140.
212
ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 278–82. White, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT,
supra note 13, at 137, 140.
213
RALPH, supra note 13, at 226–27.
214
See supra Part II.A.1.
215
These difficult questions even raised concerns about the prospects for getting the Leadership Council off
the ground at all. White, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 137. Prior to the actual
development of the Leadership Council, a temporary chair of a follow-up subcommittee acquired over
$125,000 for the new organization, through grants and fundraising. RALPH, supra note 13, at 206.
216
Along with the major programs discussed here, the Leadership Council pursued a variety of methods to
work towards fair housing, including, but not limited to, the following: researching housing conditions
affecting Black people, awareness-raising through direct action and media efforts, testing to confirm
discrimination, counseling services to assist moving families, monitoring of housing practices, and
providing trainings to the real estate industry. See, e.g., White, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT,
supra note 13, at 137–40.
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with nondiscriminatory listings.217 The Council thought that in three years, the program
would no longer be necessary.218 That goal turned out to be unrealistic, and the program
made virtually no progress in acquiring nondiscriminatory listings from realtors.219 It was
not an auspicious beginning.220
B. The Gautreaux Litigation
As the Chicago Freedom Movement was spawning the Leadership Council, the
ACLU filed the Gautreaux companion cases against CHA and HUD in federal district
court.221 Presiding Judge Richard Austin proceeded with the CHA case and held the HUD
case in abeyance because the latter was derivative of the case against the local agency.222
If the CHA case had been decided in favor of CHA, then there was no basis for a case
against HUD. HUD’s liability—if any—was for funding the discriminatory practices of
CHA.

Rather than working outside the market, as prior fair housing efforts had done, this program was designed
to alter the current housing market and make it available to all. BERRY, supra note 208, at 20.
217
Id. at 21–22.
218
Id. at 21, 47. The service planned to operate within Black neighborhoods to market to Black residents
looking for housing, work with Black employers in the suburbs, and do typical real estate marketing with
their listings. The Equal Opportunity Housing Service was designed as a separate unit within the
Leadership Council. The staff and director of the unit reported to the executive director of the Leadership
Council, who reported to the board of directors. It was designed to have a central office in the Chicago
Loop, as well as three neighborhood offices set up in the South Shore, Austin, and the near southwest side.
The near southwest office never opened, and the Austin office was forced to close by neighborhood groups.
Id. at 21–24.
The Leadership Council felt that because its board included influential civic leadership, it was in a position
to secure the necessary cooperation of the real estate industry. They also planned a promotional campaign
to get listings from private landlords. Id. at 21–22.
219
Id. at 24–25, 61. The program basically provided publicly available newspaper listings, and nothing
additional. Id. at 61.
Program staff felt the goals were unrealistic and that the board should use more aggressive tactics rather
than expecting voluntary cooperation. Board members included leaders in the real estate industry who
claimed to want fair housing, but also claimed to not be able to control how their companies acted. Id. at
32. The real estate industry did not change, and an evaluator concluded that the program was a “dismal
failure.” Id. at 62. Some credit should be given to the Leadership Council for this time, as they helped get
fair housing ordinances passed, which in turn helped facilitate moves. Id. at 65.
220
The organization grew and developed in important ways over its first decade. See infra Part III.C.
221
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 47–49.
222
Id. at 68. Judge Austin was a former prosecutor and state court judge who had once run for governor as
Mayor Richard J. Daley’s handpicked nominee. He was a white man, like every judge who succeeded him
on the Gautreaux case. After Judge Austin’s death, Judge John Crowley took over briefly, followed by
Judge Marvin Aspen. Judge Aspen was also tied to Daley. He had worked both as a lawyer for the City of
Chicago and for Mayor Daley personally. He would hold the case for four decades, during which time he
oversaw the appointment of a receiver in the CHA case, upheld the consent decree in the HUD case
institutionalizing the agreements related to the Gautreaux Program, and dismissed the case against HUD.
Id. at 49.
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1. The CHA Case
In February 1969, Judge Austin granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding
that CHA intentionally discriminated in selecting sites for public housing in Black areas.223
From 1954 through 1966, 99.4% of CHA’s family units—all but sixty-three—were placed
in largely Black neighborhoods.224 The judge determined that only intentional racial
discrimination could explain such a pattern.225 The judge rejected CHA’s defense that the
City Council, with site approval authority under state law, rejected almost all sites that
CHA proposed outside of Black neighborhoods.226 CHA’s willingness to proceed under
the Council’s segregation regime violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights.227
The judge also found that the tenant assignment practices, with segregated waiting
lists, violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.228 He threw out CHA’s
assertion that it was trying to avoid further racial tension and violence, like that which
occurred when the agency assigned some Black families to white-area public housing
developments in the 1950s.229 Judge Austin found that the whole system under which CHA
operated was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.230
The court next had to fashion a remedy to address CHA’s entire system of racial
discrimination, which was an unprecedented challenge.231 The court had to craft relief from
whole cloth, so Judge Austin invited the parties to submit proposed orders.232 The court’s
July 1969 order, which closely adhered to the plaintiffs’ counsel’s submission, forced CHA
to desegregate by moving Black families into public housing in mostly white

223

Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The Gautreaux plaintiffs had
challenged CHA's informal, covert policies and practices that allegedly had both the intent and effect of
producing a racially segregated public housing system in Chicago. In March 1967, the plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss, on the intent counts. They then were granted access to CHA files related to site
selection. Both sides filed for summary judgement in mid-1968. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 49–64;
Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 593–95.
In many northern cities, there were explicit racial segregation policies that came with the emergence of
public housing. In the 1950s and then in the early 1960s, Peoria activists focused on segregated public
housing buildings. Walter Johnson addresses this history in St. Louis as well in THE BROKEN HEART OF
AMERICA: ST. LOUIS AND THE VIOLENT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2020).
224
Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 910.
225
Id. at 913; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 66.
226
Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 914.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 909; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
229
Id. Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’ Resistance to
Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 379–80 (2001).
230
Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 914.
231
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
232
As with school desegregation remedies, there was no formula for how to proceed in that uncharted
territory. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). Judge Austin ordered the parties to
work together to develop a proposed order. If they could not do that, they should proceed independently.
CHA chose not to participate. At the last minute, it proposed that it simply be ordered not to consider race
in locating public housing. Plaintiffs’ counsel proposed a detailed plan, which the judge largely adopted.
ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE POOR 153 (1978).
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neighborhoods.233 The centerpiece of the court’s order, termed the “scattered site”
program, required CHA to provide additional housing “as rapidly as possible” under a
locational formula emphasizing predominantly white areas from which public housing had
been systematically excluded.234 The 1969 order applied primarily to the city of Chicago,
but the order also allowed for a limited portion of the remedial housing to be provided
outside the city limits, with the agreement of local suburban officials.235
The local response to the district court’s order resembled the Deep South’s reaction
to the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decisions a decade earlier.236 In both cases,
the term “massive resistance” captured the reality.237 After the district court’s remedial
order in Chicago, CHA, Mayor Richard J. Daley, the Chicago City Council, and private
organizations and individuals all played a part in bringing public housing development to
a virtual standstill.238 Mayor Daley filled the CHA Board with commissioners who would

233

Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907.
(1969). It should be noted that the plaintiffs’ submission was created entirely by the lawyers, with no
consultation of the plaintiffs themselves. Hal Baron criticized the Gautreaux pro bono lawyers on this
ground: “When you have pro bono with poor clients, the lawyers become their own clients.” Baron
illustrated the point by referring to a conversation he had with Alex Polikoff, the lead lawyer for the
Gautreaux plaintiffs, after the court had found a violation by CHA and was proceeding to the remedial
stage of the case. Baron asked how the plaintiffs could help in fashioning a remedy. According to Baron,
Polikoff said that the plaintiffs were “not necessary. We can figure out the public good.” Baron thought that
if Dorothy Gautreaux were alive, she would have organized the plaintiffs and insisted on more plaintiff
involvement in the remedy. Interview with Hal Baron, former Rsch. Dir. of Chi. Urban League, in Chi., Ill.
(Aug. 8, 2012); Interview by Alan Mills, with Hal Baron, former Rsch. Dir. of Chi. Urban League, in Chi.,
Ill. (Apr. 6, 1981).
234
Gautreaux, 304 F. Supp. 736. The order had no timetable. In light of the history of white
neighborhoods’ hostility to public housing, the order contained provisions designed to accommodate white
residents’ concerns and reduce community resistance. The new public housing developments would be
low-rise, small, and scattered, rather than the recent concentrations of large-scale, high-rise developments.
Moreover, CHA was to reserve half of the units in each development for low-income families already
living in the neighborhood—presumably white families living in predominantly white neighborhoods. Id. at
738. RUBINOWITZ AND ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 26–27 (2000).
235
State law permitted CHA to operate outside the city by agreement with suburban public housing
agencies. The order gave CHA the option of providing up to one-third of the remedial housing in white
areas of suburban Cook County. However, no suburban housing authorities agreed to participate.
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 71, 75–76; see infra Part III.A.1.i.
236
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
237
See generally CLIVE WEBB, MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION (2005); Arnold R. Hirsch, Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park,
Chicago, 1953–1966, 82 J. AM. HIST. 522 (1995).
238
Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 596; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 94–96.
This obstruction necessitated continuous returns to the court for additional orders, with inevitable delays
involved in hearings and appeals. Aspen said that to his knowledge, it was the longest-running case in
federal court history with 121 pages of docket entries. Interview with Judge Aspen, U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL.
1:14:57 (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/Pages.aspx?page=interviewJudgeAspen.
CHA’s remedial performance was so abysmal that Judge Marvin Aspen, who presided for more than four
decades beginning in 1981, finally took the extraordinary step of appointing a receiver in 1987 (eighteen
years after the original order) to administer the scattered site program. Judge Aspen appointed the Habitat
Company, a private developer, as receiver. Habitat reported directly to the court rather than to the CHA
board. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 197–98.
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not “rock the boat.”239 When CHA did approve a site, the City Council would deny
approval, or defer action, to avoid any public disputes.240 Private citizens also filed lawsuits
and protested to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods.241 The years of resistance
and resulting inaction demonstrated that any hope of achieving significant progress in
providing desegregated housing opportunities for the plaintiffs had to come from the HUD
case.242
2. The HUD Case
Once Judge Austin had decided the CHA case, he turned to the one against HUD.243
The HUD case derived from CHA’s and was based on the structure of the public housing
program.244 While local public housing agencies had substantial authority to develop and
manage public housing, HUD paid the capital cost of local developments and approved
construction sites and tenant assignment plans.245 The plaintiffs claimed that HUD had
illegally approved and funded CHA’s discriminatory program, contributing over $350
million between 1950 and 1966.246
In 1970, Judge Austin dismissed the case against HUD.247 He found that the officials
had faced a dilemma that precluded liability.248 On one hand, HUD tried in good faith, but
unsuccessfully, to get CHA to administer the program on a non-discriminatory basis. On
the other hand, if HUD officials refused to approve and fund the city’s program as a means
of forcing CHA into compliance, it would have deprived low-income families of muchneeded affordable housing.249 However, the next year, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
239

HIRSCH, supra note 17, at 257.
Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 596.
241
One group of Chicago homeowners sued CHA on the basis of “people pollution,” the idea that public
housing tenants as a group were of a lower social class, more likely to be criminals, not maintain property,
etc. The suit alleged that the CHA project violated the National Environmental Policy Act. The judge ruled
that “although human beings may be polluters, they are not themselves the pollution.” POLIKOFF, supra
note 15, at 162–63. Other community groups held meetings or protests, including protesting at Polikoff’s
house and an organized campaign of phone calls to BPI board members. The opposition was mounted even
in response to extremely small proposed developments. Six hundred neighborhood residents protested a
proposed three-flat, one unit of which would have gone to a neighborhood family. Mayor Daley weighed in
on this, arguing that it was not a matter of race but of property values. “Most of these people don’t have
stock portfolios. The only thing they have is their bungalow. They just want to know can they hold their
value.” POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 166. Moreover, private citizens lobbied their council members to block
proposed sites, while some builders bought and developed proposed sites before CHA could get control of
them, making them unavailable for public housing. Id. at 159–66; Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 596.
242
In 1981, the district judge commented on CHA’s performance before adopting a consent decree on a
different aspect of the remedy: “Thus, despite continuous litigation, numerous hearings and remedial court
orders . . . during the past twelve years, plaintiffs have yet to realize more than token relief.” Gautreaux v.
Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 667 (1981). To emphasize the point, he said: “From 1969 to 1979 progress in
providing remedial housing was negligible.” Id. at 668.
243
Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 597; Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 288–89 (1976); Gautreaux v.
Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
244
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 36.
245
Id.
246
Id.; Complaint at 20 n.16, Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
247
Gautreaux v. Romney, No. 66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1970) at 6.
248
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731, 733, 737 (7th Cir. 1971).
249
Id. at 737.
240

34

Vol. 17:2]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Michelle Shaw

lower court and held HUD liable for approving and funding CHA’s racially discriminatory
site selection and tenant assignment policies and practices.250
When the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court in 1971, Judge
Austin ordered the parties to formulate “a comprehensive plan to remedy the past effects
of unconstitutional site selection procedures.”251 At the plaintiffs’ request, the order
directed the parties to include “alternatives which are not confined in their scope to the
geographic boundary of the City of Chicago.”252
In response, plaintiffs asked the court to create a remedy consisting of a metropolitan
plan for relief.”253 A metropolitan plan would allow plaintiffs to move throughout the very
large, six-county metropolitan area, rather than only different neighborhoods in the city of
Chicago.254 They argued that a metropolitan remedial plan was necessary to fix the past
effects of the unconstitutional segregation and that it provided other benefits related to
employment, education, and safety.255 The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ metropolitan
proposal and concluded that the remedy must be limited to the city of Chicago.256 He
emphasized that the violations had taken place within the city of Chicago, and the plaintiffs
were all city residents.257 Moreover, there were no allegations that HUD had discriminated
or fostered discrimination in the suburbs.258

250

Id. at 739–40; Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 598–99.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 290 (1976); see Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F.Supp. 366, 368 (N.D.
Ill., 1971). Plaintiffs’ counsel sought HUD’s participation in the development of an order, but the agency
declined to discuss such a joint effort. Letter from Alexander Polikoff to Judge Richard Austin (Apr. 27,
1972).
252
Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. at 690–91 (N.D. Ill. 1973). It is not clear why Judge Austin
included the possibility of metropolitan relief when he invited the parties to submit proposed remedial
plans. Plaintiff’s counsel proposed it and he seemed to accept it without explanation and serious
consideration of the implications. He had declined to find HUD liable in the first place, which suggested
that he would probably adopt a very limited remedy. Gautreaux v. Romney, No, 66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill.
Sept.1, 1970).
253
The plaintiffs’ proposed order would have provided for metropolitan-wide relief, extending the limited
focus on the suburbs in the CHA order. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 36; POLIKOFF,
supra note 15, at 108; Roger J. Dennis & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, School Desegregation Versus Public
Housing Desegregation: The Local School District and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URB. L.
ANN. 145, 175 (1975). In support of this approach, they submitted a memorandum that developed a legal,
policy, and practical rationale for an expanded geographical reach of the remedy. Rubinowitz, supra note
46, at 599.
251

HUD proposed an order that would require it to use its “best efforts” to assist CHA in providing relief
within the city. Id.
254
See infra Part III.A.1.
255
Memoranda in Support of Plaintiffs’ Outline of Proposed Final Order Embodying Comprehensive Plan
for Relief; Memorandum #2- The Additional Dwelling Units to Be Provided Should Be Located
Throughout a Defined Metropolitan Area (3 July 1972).
256
Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. at 690–91 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Though the judge invited the parties to
submit a metropolitan plan, when that aspect of the order became the center of attention during the
proceedings, he rejected it out of hand. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 108–20; see supra note 252.
257
Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. at 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
258
Further, the judge held that it was not permissible to impose obligations on suburban entities that were
not involved in discriminatory site selection in Chicago. Id. Since the judge ruled on a motion asking him
to consider metropolitan-wide relief, his decision addressed the abstract principle rather than any specific
proposed metropolitan plan. Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 599.
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Once again, the Seventh Circuit reversed. In 1974, it concluded that “on the record
here it is necessary and equitable that any remedial plan to be effective must be on a
suburban or metropolitan area basis.”259 The court relied heavily on HUD’s regulations and
officials’ statements about the necessity of addressing housing problems on a metropolitan
basis.260 As a result, the court remanded the case for “the adoption of a comprehensive
metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system
in the City of Chicago which has resulted from CHA’s and HUD’s unconstitutional site
selection and tenant assignment procedures but will increase the supply of dwelling units
as rapidly as possible.”261
In response to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the federal government petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court granted it.262 The government argued that there
was no basis for metropolitan-wide relief. In 1976, the Supreme Court rejected the
government’s position and concluded that the district judge had the power to adopt a
metropolitan-wide remedy, leaving the trial judge to decide whether to do so.263
By 1976, the court case had been working its way through the system for ten years,
with very little progress on the ground. Similarly, the Leadership Council, as a continuation
of the Chicago Freedom Movement, was plugging along in its efforts, but not getting
significant results. However, the efforts would not be wasted, as these steps would lead to
future opportunities for collaboration.
III.

CHANGED CONTEXT: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR COLLABORATION

In the decade from 1966 to 1976, changes set the stage for collaboration between the
Gautreaux lawyers and the Chicago Freedom Movement’s successor organization, the
The judge adopted HUD’s proposed order requiring agency officials to “use their best efforts to cooperate
with CHA in its efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units” in conformity with applicable law,
including the original order against CHA.
259
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d at 936. While the Gautreaux lawyers took longer than the
Chicago Freedom Movement to fully expand their focus to the metropolitan area, that was because the
question of the full-scale spatial expansion was part of the HUD case, on which the district deferred action
until the resolution of the CHA case.
260
The court quoted the HUD General Counsel saying that “[t]he elimination of slums and the provision of
decent housing for families of low income in the locality are matters of metropolitan area scope but of
primary concern to the central city because the problem and impact are intensified there. In effect,
therefore, the State legislatures have determined that the city and its surrounding area comprise a single
‘locality’ for low-rent housing purposes,” and further pointed to a HUD regulation which notes “housing
market areas often are independent of arbitrary political boundaries.” Id. at 937.
261
Id. at 939.
262
Brief for the Petitioner, Hills v. Gautreaux, 421 U.S. 962 (No, 74-1047), 1975 WL 173594. The
Solicitor General has the authority to decide whether to petition for certiorari when a government agency
loses a civil case. See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control
over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L.REV. 255 (1994). Solicitor General Bork petitioned the
Court because he believed that: 1) HUD was a solid agency that had done the best it could under the
circumstances to provide much-needed housing for low-income people; and 2) federal courts should not
interfere with the operations of federal agencies, and he wanted to stop the trend of judicial governance of
administrative agencies. Telephone Interview by Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, former HUD General
Counsel (Dec. 1, 2019); Hills v. Gautreaux, 421 U.S. 962, 962 (1975) (granting certiorari).
263
See infra Part III.B.2.
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Leadership Council. First, internal factors within the two organization—commitments to a
metropolitan-wide approach, new strategies for assisting families with moving, and turning
to the private housing market—created a convergence in methodology that had not existed
initially. Additionally, three external changes initiated by the three branches of the federal
government, outside the control of the activists and lawyers—Congress’s Section 8 rental
assistance program, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the HUD case, and HUD’s own
willingness to create an experimental housing program—made collaboration a viable
option.264
With these changed conditions, the Gautreaux lawyers and the Leadership Council
joined forces to create and administer a new, metropolitan-wide housing program.265 Thus
1976 became a critical turning point in this account. Partnering replaced independent
action, and paths that had been separate came together. As collaboration blossomed,
synergy became possible.
A. Internal Factors
By 1976, internal factors in both groups transformed the idea of collaboration from
irrelevant to viable and promising. First, the organizations shared a commitment to a
metropolitan-wide approach to providing housing opportunities.266 Additionally, both were
open to pursuing new strategies for programs that assisted families with moving.267 Finally,
they both turned to the private rental housing market in pursuit of their goals.268
1. Metropolitan-wide Focus
The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Gautreaux litigation both initially limited
their geographical focus to the city of Chicago.269 By the time the litigators and activists
joined forces in 1976, they shared the view that the entire Chicago metropolitan area, rather
than just the city, constituted the appropriate space for addressing housing discrimination
and segregation.270 At first, they set their sights beyond the city at different times and in
different ways, but when the collaborative Gautreaux Program began in 1976,
metropolitanization had become a common and central theme.271
Even before there was a Chicago Freedom Movement, Dr. King recognized the need
to address suburban housing discrimination. When he visited Chicago during the summer
of 1965, he accepted several invitations to speak in the suburbs.272 One invitation came
from the North Shore Summer Project, an organization addressing housing discrimination
264

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
266
See infra Part III.A.1.i.
267
See infra Part III.A.1.ii.
268
See supra Part I.B.3 and infra Part III.A.1.iii.
269
See supra Part I.A.2.
270
The metropolitan thrust was embodied in the 1966 Summit Agreement in the Chicago Freedom
Movement. See supra Part II.A.1. In the Gautreaux litigation, the 1969 original order had a very limited
provision for remedial housing in the suburbs. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. In the 1972
effort to define a remedy against HUD, plaintiffs’ counsel made the metropolitan focus center stage. See
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15 at 36.
271
See infra Part III.B.3.
272
Gail Schechter, The North Shore Summer Project: “We’re Gonna Open up the Whole North Shore,” in
THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 164.
265
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in the northern suburbs near Lake Michigan.273 On the village green of all-white Winnetka,
Dr. King challenged the 10,000 (almost all white) people in attendance to address suburban
housing discrimination and segregation.274 That speech served as a precursor to Dr. King’s
return to the city.275 A year later, the Chicago Freedom Movement explicitly broadened its
focus to the Chicago metropolitan area in the 1966 summit meetings and the resulting
Summit Agreement.276
During the summit meetings, both Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Chicago Freedom
Movement representatives supported the idea of expanding the focus to the entire
metropolitan area.277 Although they had different reasons for their positions, their interests
converged on an explicit expansion of the scope of the enterprise.278 Mayor Daley pressed
repeatedly for the idea that the suburbs should share a responsibility with the city to address
the housing problems and that they should be part of the efforts going forward.279 In his
introductory statements at the summit meeting, he pointed out that housing was a
metropolitan problem, and he suggested that the city had done its share—more than any
other city on that issue.280 In his mind, it was time for the suburbs to step up and be part of
the solution.281

Id. at 154–64. Dr. King said: “We must go all out to end segregation in housing . . . Every white person
does great injury to his child to grow up in a world that is two-thirds colored and yet live in conditions
where that child does not come into person-to-person contact with colored people . . . Racism in housing
will not be removed until there is an assault on the structure of power that reaps huge profits from the
divisions in our society. What is profitable to a Realtor is not always profitable to a city . . . .” E-mail from
Gail Schecter to first author (Sept. 20, 2020).
273

This was his first public address on the North Shore. He spoke at two North Shore Jewish congregations—
Beth Emet in Evanston and Congregation Solel in Highland Park. Schechter, supra note 13, at 163.
274
Id. Crowd estimates vary from 8,000 to 15,000. Id. at 179 n. 28; RALPH, supra note 13, at 34–35.
The commemorative marker at the site quotes him: “History has presented us with a cosmic challenge . . .
We must now learn to live together as brothers or we will perish as fools.” The marker states that “[o]n July
25, 1965, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke to a crowd of 8,000 on Winnetka’s Village Green.”
275
See supra Part I.A.2.
276
See supra Part II.A.1. During the summit meetings, Mayor Daley sought and received an injunction that
limited the marches to one per day, in one neighborhood only, and no more than 500 people. In response,
the movement carried out marches in the suburbs, including Evergreen Park and Chicago Heights.
Schechter, in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 163; McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966,
supra note 13, at 141–42.
Prior to the summer campaign, CFM activists were involved in Oak Park’s battle over housing
discrimination. RALPH, supra note 13, at 100–01.
277
McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 111, 121, 137.
278
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemna, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 528–33 (1980) (arguing that Brown v. Board, and other Black people’s progress occurs when
white people have their own reasons for supporting the changes).
279
Kathleen Connolly, The Chicago Open Housing Conference, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 74.
Daley also suggested that there was a need for a state open occupancy law that covered the metropolitan
area. McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 125–26.
280
Connolly, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 74.
281
Id.; McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 125–26, 130, 140. Charles Swibel, head of the
Chicago Housing Authority, also urged that the suburbs should be involved, by providing land on which to
build public housing. McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 117. Two of the ten points of the
summit agreement specifically addressed metropolitan issues. Daley said about the agreement: “I’m
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While the mayor sought to limit the city’s responsibilities by including the suburbs,
Dr. King had no interest in letting the city off the hook.282 Instead, he wanted to expand the
geographical impact of the movement, as he had proposed the previous summer.283
Additionally, the name that the organizers picked for the organization charged with
implementing the Summit Agreement—the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open
Communities—reflected both its goals and its geographical focus.284 The Agreement
repeatedly referred to its metropolitan scope.285 The Agreement thus expanded the Chicago
Freedom Movement’s initial concept of an “open city” to the metropolitan area.
The Gautreaux lawyers also focused on the city originally, but they planted a seed
for expanding their efforts beyond the city boundaries when they proposed a partial
suburban option in the CHA remedy.286 As discussed above in Part II(B)(1), the district
judge adopted that limited provision in his 1969 order.287
The first opportunity for plaintiffs’ lawyers to press for a full-scale metropolitan
approach came in 1972, after the Seventh Circuit established HUD’s liability and the
district judge was considering the plaintiffs’ proposed remedies.288 Plaintiffs’ lawyers
argued as a matter of principle and practicality that a metropolitan-wide remedy was
permissible and appropriate.289 Final resolution of that question had to wait until the
Supreme Court’s decision four years later, but the lawyers emphatically made the
metropolitan focus a commitment, just like the Chicago Freedom Movement.290
satisfied that the people of Chicago and the suburbs will accept this program in light of the people who
endorsed it.” ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 272.
282
See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
283
Id. In the summit meeting, Dr. King said that he saw nothing in the world more dangerous than Negro
cities ringed with white suburbs. McKnight, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 121.
284
See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. The opening paragraph of the agreement stated its
purpose in metropolitan terms: “Th[e] subcommittee has been discussing a problem that exists in every
metropolitan area in America. It has been earnestly seeking immediate, practical, and effective steps which
can be taken to create a fair housing market in metropolitan Chicago.” Summit Agreement, in CHICAGO
1966, supra note 13, at 147; ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 13, at 260–62.
285
The ‘Summit Agreement,’ in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 13, at 153–54. Point 10 made a series of
statements about geographical scope of the organization to be formed:
1. “Its membership should reflect the diverse racial and ethnic composition of the entire
Chicago metropolitan community.”
2. It should carry forward programs such as “the convening of conferences on fair
housing in suburban communities to the end that the policy of the City of Chicago on fair
housing will be adopted in the whole Chicago metropolitan area.”
3. “The group should emphasize that the metropolitan housing market is a single market.”
286
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
287
See supra note 241 and accompanying text. Mayor Daley responded to the decision by again bringing up
the metropolitan question, just as he had three years earlier in the Chicago Freedom Movement summit
meetings. See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text. He said that “there is no public housing in the
suburbs. [This was not literally true, but there was very little compared to Chicago.] Surely the
metropolitan area should open up if we are going to answer the problem.” POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 67.
The issue of Metropolitanization was a major topic of discussion with Judge Austin in chambers as well. Id.
at 70–72.
288
Id. at 108–09; RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 37, 45. While the Chicago Freedom
Movement could simply adopt a metropolitan-wide goal and proceed accordingly, the litigators were
subject to the court’s jurisdiction and remedial power to decide on the permissible geographical scope of
the remedy. See supra Part II.B.2.
289
See supra notes 262–63.
290
See infra Part III.B.2.
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That resolution would have important practical applications. The metropolitan focus
dramatically expanded the geographical area within which families could secure
housing.291 The great postwar growth of suburban rental housing, along with the even
larger explosion of owner-occupied properties, gave any metropolitan-wide rental program
a large potential supply of units.292 The demographic diversity of the much larger area
created significantly increased opportunities for integrative moves.293
2. Converging Strategies
In 1966, the Chicago Freedom Movement and Gautreaux lawyers’ respective
strategies sent the former to the streets and the latter to the federal courts. Those initial
deeply held disparate strategies for bringing about social change put them on separate
courses for the foreseeable future. A decade later, that picture changed dramatically. The
Chicago Freedom Movement’s direct action campaign had long since concluded.294 The
movement’s impact continued in the form of the Leadership Council, which worked to
implement the Summit Agreement.295
An analogous transition took place with the Gautreaux litigation.296 A decade after
filing the companion cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers moved from pursuing their objectives
exclusively through the formal judicial process to seeking a negotiated approach.297 In the
CHA case, plaintiffs’ lawyers had been fighting in court for a decade, seeking a variety of
modification and enforcement orders in search of effective relief—with little effect.298
Additionally, in the HUD case, it took the Supreme Court a decade to reach a definitive
decision about the geographical scope of permissible relief.299 The slow pace of judicial
action, coupled with the dire need for relief from housing segregation and discrimination,
forced plaintiffs’ counsel to search for alternative strategies. After a decade of frustration
and disillusionment with the formal litigation process, Gautreaux lawyers sought to avoid
a return to the district court for additional formal proceedings and chose instead to work
out an effective housing program directly with HUD.300 While still under the court’s
umbrella, negotiation moved to center stage, replacing formal litigation.301

291

While the city of Chicago had a population of 3.4 million people, 1.2 million housing units, and 228
square miles, the metropolitan area included over 200 municipalities in six counties, with 7 million
residents, 2.3 million housing units, and 3,690 square miles. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at
45.
292
Many of those units would not have been available to such a program. See infra Part IV.B.
293
Like the city, Chicago’s suburbs were largely racially and economically segregated. See generally,
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 39 and ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, on the extreme segregation in the
Chicago area, and the role of government in creating and maintaining the patterns of segregation.
294
See supra Part II.A.1.
295
See supra note 216.
296
See infra Part III.B.3.
297
Id.
298
See supra Part II.B.1.
299
See infra Part III.B.2.
300
See infra Part III.B.3.
301
See infra Part III.B.3. Informal negotiations were initiated and carried out by the parties, while the legal
case remained open and active. Id.
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3. A Turn to the Private Rental Housing Market
The Chicago Freedom Movement originally focused on two parts of the private
housing market—single-family homes in primarily middle-class white neighborhoods and
slum housing in low-income Black neighborhoods.302 With the Summit Agreement in
place, the Movement’s focus extended not only geographically but to all types of housing
in metropolitan Chicago’s six counties.303
As detailed in Part I above, the Gautreaux case initially focused entirely on public
housing. After Section 8 became the main federal subsidy program, opportunities for
implementing a remedy shifted to the private market.304 Both the lawyers’ and the
Leadership Council’s goals included providing low-income Black families with affordable
rental housing, on a fair housing basis, throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.305 This
convergence in goals between the litigation’s remedial program and the Leadership
Council’s role in implementing the Summit Agreement of 1966 generated an opportunity
for cooperation.306
4. Capacity: Manageable Plates
While the development of the Gautreaux Program required creativity, determination,
and flexibility, the Gautreaux lawyers and the Leadership Council had a decade of
experience that prepared them to join forces.307 They each also had the expertise that
replaced the steep learning curves that posed such a challenge a decade earlier.308 Both
organizations also had well defined goals, and a staff structure prepared to address those
goals.309 Moreover, this new initiative became top priority for each of them, and they
shared the willingness to invest the time and staff necessary to carry out the program.310
B. External Factors
In addition to changes in the two organizations’ internal factors, external decisions
by all three branches of the federal government laid the groundwork for synergy. First, in
1974, Congress created Section 8, a rent subsidy program that provided a new vehicle for
relief for the plaintiff class.311 Then, in 1976, the Supreme Court held that the district court
could adopt metropolitan-wide relief in the HUD case.312 Later that year, HUD agreed to
302

See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
Summit Agreement, supra note 205, at 445 (“The proposed board . . . should carry forward
programs . . . to the end that the policy of the City of Chicago on fair housing will be adopted in the whole
Chicago metropolitan area.”).
304
See infra Part III.B.1.
305
See supra Part III.A.1.i.
306
The fit was particularly close with the Chicago Freedom Movement’s “end the slums” project, which
aimed at creating opportunities for decent housing for low-income families. See supra notes 35, 171–174.
307
See infra Part V.A.
308
See supra note 142 and accompanying text for further discussion on the Gautreaux lawyer Polikoff. See
infra Part III.C. for discussion on the Leadership Council.
309
Id.
310
See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 232–33; RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 50–51.
311
See infra Part III.B.1.
312
See infra Part III.B.2.
303
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fund an experimental program using Section 8 funds to move families into private rental
housing throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.313
1. Congressional Enactment of the Section 8 Program
In 1972, when the plaintiffs’ lawyers began to press for a metropolitan-wide remedy,
the design and implementation of such an approach would have faced many obstacles and
offered limited potential for progress.314 The only remedial approach available was for
CHA to build public housing in the suburbs.315 By that time, CHA had demonstrated its
intransigence and incompetence.316 Moreover, suburban housing authorities uniformly
rejected CHA’s requests for permission to build public housing outside the city as
permitted under the original order.317 With this bleak picture of continuing roadblocks,
significant implementation of any metropolitan remedy had to await the arrival of a more
effective program for the purpose—one that CHA would not administer.318 Fortuitously,
in 1974, Congress created a subsidized housing program that provided a far more
promising remedial vehicle.319 The Section 8 program served as a critical contributor to
synergy.320
313

See infra Part III.B.3.
There was little reason to expect that any of the suburban agencies would reach agreements under the
HUD case that would welcome low-income Chicago residents into their communities. The Housing
Authority of Cook County, the largest public housing agency outside of the city (Chicago is the county seat
of Cook County), had similar racial patterns to the city, making it an unlikely partner for this purpose.
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 22. There was evidence that DuPage County, an affluent,
predominantly white county west of Chicago, had created a housing authority to make sure that there would
be no public housing in the area. Id. (citing LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ, LOW INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN
STRATEGIES (1974)).
314

Assuming their continuing refusal, the only scenario under which CHA could have built housing in the
suburbs was for the district judge to set aside the state law providing for suburban local officials’ agreement
and order CHA to proceed without their approval. Plaintiffs’ counsel could refer to an arguably analogous
step that Judge Austin had taken in the CHA case. He had set aside the state statute giving the Chicago City
Council veto power over proposed sites because the Council’s failure to act impeded remedying a
constitutional violation. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827, 829–30 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
However, Judge Austin had demonstrated deep skepticism about the HUD case from the outset. He had
dismissed the case against HUD, only to be reversed by the Seventh Circuit. See supra Part II.B.2. He then
refused to consider any metropolitan remedy, concluding that there was no basis for relief extending to the
suburbs. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973) rev’d sub nom. Gautreaux v. Chi.
Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 938–39 (7th Cir. 1974).
Given his consistent posture in the HUD case, it is highly unlikely that Judge Austin would have taken the
extraordinary step of setting aside a state statute as it applied to large numbers of suburbs that were not
implicated in the violation. Even if all of those obstacles could have been overcome, the challenges of
getting public housing built in suburbs that were likely to be extremely resistant would have been daunting.
315
See infra note 326.
316
See supra Part II.B.1.
317
Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 597, n.20. See supra notes 291–94.
318
See infra Part V.B.
319
42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
320
Section 8 came as part of a reinvention of federal subsidized housing programs during the Nixon
Administration. Early in 1973, the Nixon administration announced a moratorium on most federal housing
programs, including the public housing program that was at the center of the Gautreaux litigation. (Projects
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Under Section 8, federal rent subsidies paid the difference between a specified
percentage of tenants’ income and the market rent for the apartments.321 The program had
two major variations.322 For project-based Section 8, an entire privately-owned building or
development served low-income renters receiving subsidies that made the housing
affordable.323 Tenant-based Section 8 made federal rent subsidies available for low-income
households to secure housing in the private market.324 It provided eligible tenants with
vouchers to use in private housing with landlords willing to participate and rents within
specified ceilings.325 With privatization at its core, the program did not require housing
providers to secure local approvals beyond those applicable to any housing in the
community.326 With the advent of tenant-based Section 8, an essential ingredient for a
potential collaboration between the Leadership Council and the Gautreaux lawyers became
available.

that were already underway could proceed.) The President severely criticized the traditional federal
approach to housing and ordered HUD to undertake a comprehensive study in order to propose a new,
long-term solution to the housing problem. MORRIS, supra note 94, at 2–3; CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA,
KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 38
(2006).
Critics of the moratorium argued that it was a subterfuge designed to scuttle HUD’s fledgling efforts to use
its subsidy programs to assist Black and other low-income households to move to the suburbs. HUD had
attempted to leverage federal funds to suburbs to pursue racial integration in their communities. Id.
Initially, President Nixon responded to HUD’s initiatives with a lengthy Statement About Federal Policies
Relative to Equal Housing Opportunity. Statement about Federal Housing Policies Relative to Equal
Housing Opportunity, 1971 PUB. PAPERS 721 (June 11, 1971). The implicit rejection of HUD’s efforts was,
“This Administration will not attempt to impose federally assisted housing upon any community.” Id. at
731. The moratorium on housing programs followed a year and a half later.
Congress modeled the existing housing portion of the Section 8 program on the modest “leased housing
program” created a decade earlier. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, §
23, 79 Stat. 451, 455 (1965).
The result was the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. It contained the Section 8 program,
which was to serve as the primary mechanism for providing affordable housing. The statute continued
some of the previous housing programs, but at dramatically lower levels of funding. 12 U.S.C. § 1706e;
BONASTIA, at 39. The replacement for traditional public housing became the centerpiece of the
metropolitan-wide Gautreaux Program two years later. See infra Part III.A.1.i.
321
Id.
322
42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
323
See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Section 8 was part of the public housing statute, the United
States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1437). Moreover, it served the same residents as the traditional public housing program and the courts
included it under the umbrella of the litigation. See infra Part III.B.2.
324
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). The federal program came to be known as “Housing Choice Vouchers” since
recipients received vouchers to pay for a portion of the rent to private landlords.
325
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). Under the federal statute, participation was voluntary on landlords’ part. Ceiling
rents were based on local “Fair Market Rents” (FMRs). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(B).
326
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o).
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2. The Supreme Court Decision in the HUD Case
There was great uncertainty about how the Supreme Court would decide the
metropolitan question when it arrived from the Seventh Circuit.327 In 1974, the Court found
that a Michigan district court could not adopt a school desegregation remedy extending
beyond Detroit’s city limits, where the constitutional violation had taken place.328
However, in its landmark 1976 decision Hills v. Gautreaux, the Court held 8-0 that
a metropolitan-wide housing desegregation remedy was permissible.329 The Court agreed
with the Seventh Circuit that the district judge could use his equitable power to adopt a
metropolitan-wide remedy in the public housing context.330 The Court distinguished the
public housing situation from school desegregation cases because HUD’s own definition
of the appropriate geographical area for its programs’ operations was the Chicago “housing
market area.”331 That area consisted of the six-county metropolitan region within which
home seekers competed for housing units.332 Moreover, the Court found that it was possible
to design a metropolitan-wide housing remedy that would not impermissibly interfere with
the traditional powers and functions of innocent local governmental units.333 The authority
of suburban governments and public housing agencies could remain intact, including
zoning and other land use controls.334 Also, suburban officials would not have to initiate
proposals for federal housing programs to accommodate Chicago residents.335
Having provided assurances that extending remedies beyond the city would not
interfere with local prerogatives, the Court focused on the permissible possibilities for
metropolitan-wide remedies.336 It emphasized the ways federal housing programs had
changed since the District Court’s initial decision in 1969, focusing especially on the

327

See supra notes 258–260 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court consideration also depended on
earlier decisions favorable to the plaintiffs: the district court decision in 1969 finding a violation by CHA
(Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1969)) and the Seventh Circuit decision
finding a violation by HUD, derivative of the CHA’s violation (Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738
(7th Cir. 1971)).
328
In 1974, the Court held in Milliken v. Bradley that the district court and the court of appeals had
exceeded their remedial powers in considering an inter-district remedy—one extending into the suburbs—
in a Detroit school desegregation case. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974). The Court required
both “an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect” in order to warrant an interdistrict remedy. Id. at 741,
745. Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 601. The Court held, in a 5–4 vote, that the legal basis for such an order
did not exist in that case. Id. at 600. The Milliken case cast a cloud over the metropolitan-wide approach
plaintiffs proposed in Gautreaux.
329
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305–06 (1976). The court ruled 8–0, with Justice Stevens recusing
himself because he had sat on the Seventh Circuit when it had the case before it.
330
Id. at 306. However, the Court’s reasoning differed significantly from the Circuit Court’s. See infra Part
II.B.2; notes 341–343.
331
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299.
332
Id. (“[t]he relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is the Chicago
housing market, not the Chicago city limits.”); Dennis & Rubinowitz, supra note 253, at 150–52.
333
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 303.
334
Id. at 305.
335
Id. at 303.
336
Id. at 303–05.
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Section 8 program.337 That program provided an opportunity for the creation of a new
remedial initiative that would enable plaintiff class families to secure private housing
throughout the Chicago metropolitan area, with HUD subsidizing their rents.338 In noting
the difficulties and delays in securing relief within the city, the Court seemed sympathetic
to the plaintiffs’ view that broader new initiatives held promise for more effective relief.339
However, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the district judge
was required to issue a metropolitan-wide order.340 It emphasized that it was deciding only
that a metropolitan-wide remedy was within the power of the district judge, not that it was
mandatory.341 The Court left the district judge to decide, in light of the facts of the case,
whether it was appropriate to extend the remedy beyond the city of Chicago.342 It remanded
the case to the district court to decide on the scope of the remedy, including its geographical
reach.343 As such, great uncertainty about the outcome remained despite the Court’s ruling.
3. Gautreaux–HUD Agreement: The Gautreaux Program
When the Supreme Court remanded the case, counsel for both parties chose a
different path rather than returning to the district court. Instead, lead plaintiffs’ counsel
Alex Polikoff and HUD General Counsel Robert Elliott began settlement negotiations.344
Polikoff chose that process because “[b]y now [he] was desperate to get tangible
results.”345 Forsaking the courtroom for an informal process was a pragmatic response to
the frustrations of the years of litigating the CHA case, with many enforcement orders and
337

Id. at 303–04. The District Court had concluded that the Section 8 program came under the umbrella of
this litigation. It was part of the same statute as public housing and performed the same function in terms of
eligible tenants. See Dennis & Rubinowitz, supra note 253, at 165, n.66 (referencing a May 5, 1975
unreported opinion). Once the Supreme Court treated the Section 8 program as an aspect of the public
housing program, it came under the umbrella of the Gautreaux case. See discussion of the Section 8
program, supra Part III.B.1.
338
See infra Part III.B.3.
339
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 289–90.
340
Id. at 306.
341
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 306.
342
The Court repeated this point, presumably to express respect for and deference to the district judge. Id.
The idea of deferring to the local district judge in developing civil rights remedies mirrors the Court’s
approach in Brown II. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
343
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 306. The references to the difficulties of providing relief in the city may have
been a hint about the advantages of metropolitan focus to bring about effective relief. Rubinowitz, supra
note 47, at 605.
The Court also left open the appropriate definition of desegregation as an aspect of relief. HUD would
simply be bound to do what it was already authorized or required to do under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its implementing regulations. Id. at 609.
The Court emphasized the new construction aspect of Section 8, but the actual relief relied mostly on the
existing housing component of the program. Id. at 602; Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 304; see infra Part IV.B.
The authority of suburban governments and public housing agencies would remain intact, including zoning
and other land use controls. Moreover, Gautreaux families could be housed without any effort on the part of
suburban officials. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 37; Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305.
344
See Rubinowitz, supra note 47, at 611–13, n.88. HUD’s willingness to negotiate a metropolitan-wide
approach indicated an evolution of the agency’s position since 1972. Id.
345
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 230. He recounted the record of the past—“the scattered-site program
seemed to be going nowhere” and the very limited prospects for other ongoing initiatives. Id.
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extremely limited housing opportunities for the plaintiff class to show for it.346 That mostly
futile history of relying on the court to overcome resistance provided a strong incentive to
explore an alternative approach.347 The plaintiffs still kept the case in the legal arena but
simply used a different tactic by negotiating for the agreement.348
Moreover, the plaintiffs wanted to avoid any further proceedings in front of Judge
Austin, who had resisted the plaintiffs’ claims on both the violation and relief in the HUD
case.349 The plaintiffs suspected that because he had been overruled by both the Seventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court, he would not likely endorse their proposals for a
metropolitan-wide remedy out of personal animus against them.350 Judge Austin had the
Supreme Court’s assurance that he could determine the geographical scope of relief with
finality,351 so if the plaintiffs returned to his courtroom, they incurred the significant risk
that he would limit the HUD remedy to the city.
At the same time, an extensive discussion took place within HUD about how to
respond to the remand.352 There was “strong sentiment” within the agency to “keep
fighting” to limit HUD’s obligations.353 That would have meant returning to the district
court seeking a city-only order, as it had done successfully four years earlier.354 Just as
Polikoff had reason to fear such a continuation of the formal process, HUD advocates for
a narrow remedy had reason for optimism if they went back to Judge Austin.355
Countermanding other voices within the agency, HUD General Counsel Robert
Elliott argued that settlement was “in the public’s interest” because the agency should
provide housing opportunities for low-income families on a broad geographical basis. 356
He viewed a negotiated plan as a proper vehicle to make housing available to the plaintiff
class.357 As the Supreme Court emphasized, HUD already administered many of its
housing and other programs on an area-wide basis.358 That suggested the possibility of
reaching an agreement that would not interfere with the agency’s administrative
prerogatives.359

346

Id. at 225, 230–32. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
348
“Litigation is defined broadly to include representation before administrative as well as judicial forums,
and to encompass negotiating, advising, and similar traditionally litigation-related activities.” Rabin, supra
note 74, at 209, n.10. The agreement specified terms regarding postponing seeking a metropolitan relief
order during implementation. Also, the parties did eventually return to court for a formal agreement. See
infra text accompanying note 405.
349
See supra Part II.B.2.
350
See supra notes 259, 263 and accompanying text.
351
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
352
Interview with Kale Williams, Exec. Dir. of Leadership Council, in Chi., Ill. (July 21, 1976); Telephone
Interview by Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, former HUD Gen. Couns. (Dec. 1, 2019).
353
Id.
354
See supra note 256.
355
See supra Part II.B.2.
356
Telephone Interview by Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, former HUD Gen. Couns. (Dec. 1, 2019).
357
Id.
358
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, at 299 (1976). See Dennis & Rubinowitz, supra note 253, for a
detailed account of HUD’s policies and practices that were in accord with a regional perspective.
359
At the time, HUD policy emphasized metropolitan approaches to housing problems. See Dennis &
Rubinowitz, supra note 253.
347

46

Vol. 17:2]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Michelle Shaw

Elliott and others won the fight to negotiate a metropolitan-wide agreement.360 Elliott
represented the agency in the successful negotiation of a resolution.361 The resolution
helped bypass a potentially resistant district judge and set the stage for the creation of a
program that provided substantial opportunities for plaintiff class families to move
throughout the metropolitan area.362
As part of the settlement, HUD agreed to provide Section 8 subsidies over and above
the regular allocation for the Chicago area and to fund the administrative costs involved in
carrying out the program.363 The goal was to assist 400 plaintiff class families to move to
non-minority areas throughout the region in that year and to determine the viability of
continuing the program.364
C. The Final Factor: Leadership Council Joins Forces with Gautreaux Lawyers to
Administer the Gautreaux Program
Once HUD settled with the Gautreaux plaintiffs, the plaintiffs needed to join forces
with an organization to help them design and administer the new program.365 The
Gautreaux litigation and the Leadership Council finally collaborated, as the lawyers
enlisted the Leadership Council’s assistance with HUD’s approval.366
That resolution was reflected in the commencement of negotiations between plaintiffs’ counsel and the
HUD General Counsel.
361
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 231; Telephone Interview by Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, former
HUD Gen. Couns. (Dec. 1, 2019).
362
Since this was an agreement on a pilot program, it did not include a final/formal agreement on a
metropolitan approach. Once Polikoff and Elliott reached an agreement, Elliott and HUD Secretary Carla
Hills took the matter to Philip Buchen, White House Counsel. After briefing President Ford, Buchen
returned to Elliott and Hills with one question from the president: “Is this the right thing to do?” Elliott and
Hills said yes, and Buchen responded that they had President Ford’s approval. Telephone Interview by
Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, former HUD Gen. Couns. (Dec. 1, 2019).
360

Full Text of Agreement Between Plaintiffs and HUD Concerning Implementation of Gautreaux Supreme
Court Decision, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFS. APPENDIX B HUD, 40, 40–41 (June 7, 1976) [hereinafter
Agreement]. The agreement did not bind either party beyond the year. Plaintiffs’ counsel had concerns
about HUD’s participation during that year; but they were resolved, and the parties extended the letter of
understanding for another 18 months. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 236–37.
363
Agreement, supra note 362, at 40. In its 1976 decision, the Supreme Court assumed that the remedial
scope included Section 8, based on the district court’s order the year before. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284 (1976).
364
Agreement, supra note 362, at 40. The agreement did not specifically allocate locations, but did provide
tentative goals for city and county distribution, among and within all six counties.
365
It may have theoretically been possible for CHA to administer the program. It was determined that the
Leadership Council was more qualified than CHA or HUD, along with beating out other competitors.
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 42. It does not appear that CHA was seriously considered to
administer the program, likely due to their abysmal performance up to that point. Id. at 41; POLIKOFF, supra
note 15, at 231.
366
Since HUD was funding the one-year experimental Gautreaux Program, it had to approve the selection
of the administrative entity. Federal officials agreed with plaintiffs’ counsel on that choice. So, the initial
Gautreaux–HUD agreement stipulated that HUD would contract with the Leadership Council to perform
the key functions—to locate, counsel, and assist members of the plaintiff class to find existing units, and
local owners of housing willing to participate in the program. The agreement also limited the plaintiffs’
ability to go back to court during a trial period for the program, and stated that both parties would work to
develop an ongoing remedy. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 38–42; Gautreaux v. Landrieu,
523 F. Supp. 665, 667 (1981). Later, in response to objections to its selection process, HUD put the
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A decade after its founding, the Leadership Council had become one of the leading
fair housing organizations in the country.367 While it had had a difficult start, the
Leadership Council was by that time a pioneer in developing new strategies to generate
housing opportunities.368 The business community and the establishment continued to
support it financially and institutionally, giving the Leadership Council the ability to
continue creating new techniques to fight housing segregation.369
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Fair Housing Act, and the Supreme Court
extended the reach of a century-old federal civil rights statute to private housing.370 Those
changes in the law provided the Leadership Council with the opportunity to establish a
very active legal action program with staff and pro bono lawyers.371 Investigators and
lawyers assisted home seekers who encountered racial discrimination in their housing
search.372 By the early 1970s, they generated consistently positive outcomes in those
cases.373 Black families moved into housing that had previously been unavailable because
of discrimination.374 The legal campaign also began to affect the practices of the real estate
industry.375
administrative task out for competitive bidding. HUD concluded that the Leadership Council’s competitors
lacked either the ability to operate throughout the metropolitan area or the capacity to carry out the program
effectively. See RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 41–44, 50; Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F.
Supp. 665, 667 (1981). Several similar short-term agreements culminated in a final agreement by district
court in a 1981 consent decree. The decree specified the Leadership Council as the administrator for the
duration of the program.
367
See supra Part II.A.2.
368
RALPH, supra note 13, at 7.
369
Id. at 227–28; SANDER, KUCHEVA & ZASLOFF, supra note 39, at 156–57. As Executive Director Kale
Williams stated, the premise that served as the basis for its programs was “that housing discrimination and
segregation are institutionalized in a dual housing market, the correction of which is a major social reform
requiring multiple strategies applied over a period of time.” Kale Williams, The Dual Housing Market in
the Chicago Metropolitan Area, in HOUSING CHICAGO STYLE: A CONSULTATION (1982), at 42.
370
See Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
371
BERRY, supra note 208, at 73–76.
372
Kale Williams, in HOUSING, supra note 369, at 40; BERRY, supra note 208, at 72–74. The service
utilized white testers to prove discrimination. The tester would ask to view the unit immediately after a
Black home seeker encountered resistance to test the response and act as a verification witness to the
discrimination. For a sampling of the types of cases handled by the service, see BERRY, supra note 208, at
103–06.
373
SANDER, KUCHEVA & ZASLOFF, supra note 39, at 156; BERRY, supra note 208, at 75–76, 103–04.
374
BERRY, supra note 208, at 75–76, 103–04.
375
Id. at 94, 115–16. Initially, the damages were small enough, and all individual cases against different
realtors, that the industry did not feel any effects, but as damages increased, and punitive damages were
added, there began to be a change in realtors’ behavior. Id. at 74–76, 93–94.
By 1975, Kale Williams said that in Chicago, “the enforcement of the federal fair housing law is a prompt
and effective remedy to racial discrimination in housing.” He went on to say that repeated enforcement was
“hav[ing] an effect on the real estate industry.” SANDER, KUCHEVA & ZASLOFF, supra note 39, at 157,
citing Kale Williams, Bias Marks Chicago Housing, CHI. DEFENDER, Aug. 23, 1975.
The Legal Action Program also faced internal challenges, primarily focused on how the cases were
selected. The directors thought they should not file lawsuits in areas where there was already some
integration, and the staff thought that gave people in those areas free reign to discriminate. There were also
concerns about directors having too much input on case selection, and directors’ vulnerability to
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In 1976, the Leadership Council absorbed two additional initiatives that expanded
the organization’s capacity to assist families in ways that the new collaborative program
required.376 The Home Investments Fund (HIF), a non-profit organization which had
provided counseling and assistance to minority families seeking to move throughout the
Chicago metropolitan area, merged into the Leadership Council.377 It changed its name to
the Fair Housing Center and became a subdivision of the Leadership Council, bringing
staff experienced in providing direct services to home seekers.378
Moreover, in early 1976, the Leadership Council began to work with the Illinois
Housing Development Authority (IHDA), the state housing finance agency, in developing
and administering a program that became a partial model for the Gautreaux Program.379
IHDA made reduced interest rate loans available to developers willing to provide housing
for people with modest incomes.380 The Leadership Council contracted with IHDA to
locate, counsel, and assist Gautreaux Program families to rent units in developments that
the agency financed.381 Participating in the IHDA program provided the opportunity to
learn lessons that would be valuable in shaping the larger Gautreaux Program.382
Additionally, since 1972, Kale Williams had served as the executive director of the
Leadership Council.383 Williams had experience and knowledge relevant to managing the

intimidation or pressure. BERRY, supra note 208, at 98–101. There was also a constant struggle due to the
many ways realtors discriminated. See, e.g., id. at 79–83 (quoting an order from a discrimination case
which prohibited the realtor from denying any dwelling because of race or color, saying a unit was not
available, failing to show a unit, discriminating in any services connected with a sale, i.e. financing, or
publishing any discriminatory materials. It also included an affirmative action piece, which required
training, education, procedures, and court inspection of records to ensure compliance).
The lawyers also pursued broader precedents in federal courts. Moreover, they brought legal action to
maintain racially integrated communities by preventing realtors from engaging in steering of clients to
particular places based on their race. Kale Williams, in HOUSING, supra note 369, at 40–41. See, e.g.,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that zoning that
results in a racially disproportionate impact, but does not show discriminatory intent, does not violate the
Fourteenth Am.); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (holding that that the village
and homeowners in a racially changing area have standing to challenge steering practices as indirect
victims of housing bias).
376
See infra Part V.A.
377
Kale Williams, in HOUSING, supra note 369, at 41.
378
Id.
379
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 226–30.
380
Id. at 226.
381
HUD granted IHDA $9 million for a Section 8 project-based program in Chicago. Since all Section 8
funds in Chicago were covered by the Gautreaux orders, this provided an opportunity to offer new housing
to public housing residents. Based on an agreement with the Gautreaux lawyers, IHDA required developers
that it assisted to set aside a percentage of their apartments for those families. The court order including
Section 8 in the remedy applied only to the city. But IHDA also applied this arrangement to the suburban
developments that it financed. Id. at 226–27. The one year agreement provided funding for the Leadership
Council to screen families, as well as provide counseling and other assistance. Id.; RUBINOWITZ &
ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 42. See infra Part V.A.
382
Although the IHDA program was small and did not require the Leadership Council to locate landlords
willing to participate in the program, it did put the agency in touch with low-income Black families.
383
He served in that position for 20 years. He had also been an overlapping participant in 1966. See supra
Part I.A.4.
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program, as well as a working relationship with Polikoff.384 Williams was deeply involved
in the design and creation of the program.385 He staffed it, oversaw its implementation, and
worked with Polikoff to press HUD to improve the program as it proceeded.386
By the time the Gautreaux and HUD lawyers agreed on the concept of a remedial
program, the Leadership Council had a proven track record and was well qualified to play
a major role in the design and implementation of the program.387 The lawyers on both sides
concluded that the combination of the Leadership Council’s past experience and its role in
developing the program, along with its strong leadership, made the Leadership Council the
“obvious choice” to join in the operation of the new, much larger, and more complex
initiative.388
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE GAUTREAUX PROGRAM
A. Collaboration Between the Leadership Council and the Gautreaux Lawyers
As the conditions for collaboration came together, the agreements produced a
delayed synergy between the Chicago Freedom movement, via the Leadership Council,
and the Gautreaux litigation.389 While the program faced significant obstacles, Black
families began to gain access to subsidized housing throughout the metropolitan area at a
rate that far exceeded the results of the two initiatives working separately.390 The joining
of forces continued for the next two decades, leading to 7,100 families moving through the
newfound collaboration.391 The many meetings between the lawyers and the Leadership
384

A personal relationship of mutual trust and confidence that had developed over the decade between
Gautreaux lead counsel Alex Polikoff and Kale Williams, helped provide the basis for their working
together in a way that they could not have anticipated a decade earlier. First author's observation, see infra
note 397. Elliott also had confidence that the program was in good hands with Kale Williams as Executive
Director of the Leadership Council. Telephone Interview by Moshe Melcer with Robert Elliott, HUD
General Counsel (former) (Dec. 1, 2019).
385
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 226–36.
386
Id. Later, Williams also worked with Polikoff on MTO, helping persuade officials. See infra Aftermath.
387
See supra notes 369–88 and accompanying text.
388
E-mail from first author to second author, (Oct. 3, 2008). By 1976, it had a staff of housing professionals
and lawyers. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 42. The agency had a wide range of experience
in fair housing, including legal action, public education and advocacy, and counseling of Black
homeseekers. Id.
In the early 1970s, the Leadership Council worked with a group of suburban mayors through the Regional
Housing Coalition, promoting affordable housing in the suburbs. Id. It also worked with willing members
of the real estate industry. It developed relationships with like-minded landlords and property managers,
securing their cooperation in accepting Black tenants in predominantly white areas.
Because of the innovative character of the Gautreaux Program, no organization had the precise experience
involved or the demonstrated capacity to implement it. The Leadership Council had not worked extensively
with public housing residents or other poor Black residents and thus had not had the opportunity to develop
relationships and trust with the program’s intended beneficiaries. The agency also lacked hands-on
experience with the Section 8 program, so it lacked familiarity with the program’s mechanics. Id. at 43.
389
See infra Part V.B.
390
Id.
391
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 246. The program was continued by mutual agreements until 1981, when
the parties moved for and received a consent decree that specified HUD’s total obligation as supporting
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Council and the stream of writings and telephone calls exchanged over the life of the
program attest to the closeness of the working relationship.392 Polikoff spent over half a
century as lead counsel on the case, and was greatly invested in all aspects of the case.393
He and Kale Williams served as co-leaders of the Gautreaux Program.394 They shared a
deep commitment to the goals of the program and belief in its potential for achieving
them.395 The unprecedented nature of this initiative called for everyone involved to work
together and do whatever was necessary.396
On September 15, 1976, Polikoff and other Gautreaux lawyers met with Kale
Williams and others from the Leadership Council to discuss many start up issues.397 Kale
Williams gave the lawyers both an explanation and a status report on the pre-existing IHDA
program, as it was somewhat of a model for the Gautreaux Program.398 There was also a
general discussion of current and future concerns, including questions about how to select
interested families, as well as concerns about the supply of available housing.399 This
meeting set the stage for the collaborative culture that continued throughout the Gautreaux
Program.400
Polikoff and Williams continued to work together throughout the program to
evaluate the progress, and address issues as needed.401 In December 1976, the Leadership
Council staff called a meeting to discuss their very serious concerns about the low rate of
7,100 moves. Id. at 240; RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 66. That included the Gautreaux
Program and smaller initiatives like IHDA.
HUD argued for that figure, over plaintiff counsel’s effort to establish a higher figure. Polikoff considered
that as a loss in the negotiating process. E-mail from Alexander Polikoff, to first author (Nov. 8, 2020).
392
The first author was present in many of these meetings about the program and had many conversations
with the lawyers and Leadership Council staffers over the two decades of the Gautreaux program. See
supra, note 83.
393
Polikoff was hands-on with every aspect of the case, including the Gautreaux Program, well into his 90s.
What started as a law firm partner’s pro bono assignment became the case of his career. The case occupied
much of his time for that extremely lengthy period. The other lawyers that were involved moved on or
passed away during the life of the case. His several hundred-page memoir of the case, with many aspects in
great detail, attests to his great investment in the case, including the Gautreaux Program. See generally
POLIKOFF, supra note 15.
Polikoff was especially hands-on with the Gautreaux Program because it was the most promising remedial
initiative in the case, by far. See Interview with Judge Aspen, supra note 238, at 1:06.45. He came to be
known by activists involved in housing mobility programs inspired by the Gautreaux Program as the
“father of mobility programs.” He received an award for these contributions at the 7th Annual Conference
on Housing Mobility; see 7th National Conference on Housing Mobility, POVERTY & RACE RSCH. ACTION
COUNCIL (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.prrac.org/the-7th-national-housing-mobility-conference/.
394
See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 226–36.
395
Id.
396
Id. at 226–48.
397
See generally first author’s meeting notes from Sept. 15, 1976 meeting (on file with first author)
[hereinafter Meeting Notes]. Those present at the meeting included Gautreaux lawyers Cecil Butler,
Douglas Cassell, Merrell Freed, Mary James, Jerry Muller, Robert Vollen and Bernie Weisberg, along with
Bob Johnson and Len Rubinowitz. Id.
398
Id. See supra notes 381–384 and accompanying text.
399
See Meeting Notes, supra note 397.
400
Id.; see Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 392.
401
See Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 392. Betsy Lassar, BPI lawyer, remembers joining in “many
meetings” with Leadership Council Staff, including Williams. E-mail from Betsy Lassar, BPI lawyer, to
first author (Oct. 16, 2021, 02:42 CST) (on file with first author).

51

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

moves.402 At the time of the meeting, the Leadership Council staff projected being able to
place approximately half the number of families they originally hoped to place during the
first year.403 Both Polikoff and Williams attended, along with other staff and
representatives from both organizations.404 They considered practical program solutions,
as well as improvements that would need to be approved by HUD.405
The evaluation meeting made clear that there needed to be changes to the HUD
agreement, including higher rent allowances for the Section 8 vouchers, as well as
additional subsidies for new construction in the Chicago area.406 When the Gautreaux
lawyers met with HUD to negotiate for those new arrangements, Kale Williams attended
alongside Polikoff and other lawyers.407 Though it took months to work out with HUD,
they did get the requested changes, along with an initial extension to the Gautreaux
Program itself.408 The Gautreaux lawyers and the Leadership Council staff continued this
culture of collaboration throughout the program to improve and refine issues, as
exemplified in these initial meetings.409
There were also aspects of the program which called for a more specific division of
labor.410 Williams, as head of the Leadership Council, assembled a staff of a half-dozen to
work directly with families and landlords. 411 They counseled families about housing
available in the suburbs and provided information about potential destination communities
and the experience of residential integration.412 They also assisted families with their
housing search.413 Moreover, they enlisted landlords in the program by providing
information about the Section 8 program, as well as the screening process the Leadership
Council used for including families.414 In addition, the agency sought to overcome negative
stereotypes based on race and class so that landlords would participate in the program.415
402

POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 236.
Id.
404
Id.
405
The meeting led to an agreement to put larger families on a separate waitlist, since they were so difficult
to place. They would pull those families only when the occasional large apartment became available,
freeing up resources to focus on families that were more likely to successfully find housing. Id. The
difficulty placing large families continued, and both Williams and Polikoff were still working to address it
as late as 1992. Interview with Kale Williams, Exec. Dir. of Leadership Council, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 4, 1992)
(discussing efforts to increase the supply of townhouses and single-family homes for large families).
406
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 236–37.
407
Id. at 236.
408
Id. at 236–37.
409
See Rubinowitz & Kenny, supra note 392.
410
Though even here, occasionally they worked together. See infra note 414.
411
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 227, 232–33.
412
In the regular Section 8 program, which had been operating for a couple of years, eligible participants
secured certificates from the local public housing agency, and the market operated in traditional ways after
that. The agency paid part of the rent and was responsible for ensuring that units met minimum standards,
but prospective tenants and landlords made their own matches. The Gautreaux Program required additional
administrative functions because the market was unlikely to achieve the program’s metropolitan
integrationist objectives otherwise. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 40–41.
413
Id.
414
Id. at 51–52; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 232–33. In another sign of the collaborative atmosphere,
sometimes BPI lawyers would join Leadership Council staff in talking to landlords. E-mail from Betsy
Lassar, supra note 401.
415
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 59–60.
403
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Similarly, Polikoff and the lawyers handled the ongoing legal aspects of the case.
Though many issues were handled by negotiations with HUD, there was still a court case
surrounding all of this. Throughout the 1970s, the program was extended in multiple
agreements with HUD, but the ultimate disposition remained unknown.416 In 1981, a final
consent decree was upheld on appeal, setting the framework to end the lawsuit against
HUD.417 The parties agreed on continuing the flow of both Section 8 certificates and
funding to the Leadership Council, until 7,100 occupancies.418 When 7,100 Gautreaux
families had moved, the lawsuit against HUD would officially end.419
B. Demand for the Program and Housing Supply
Initial response to the program was modest, and many potential participants were
skeptical.420 However, interest in the program burgeoned quickly and remained high for
the duration of the program.421 Word of mouth and television and newspaper accounts
dramatically increased demand.422 The program generated interest for several reasons. It
offered safer places, with better housing and schools, and better job opportunities for
parents.423 The program’s housing subsidies also drew in eligible families, especially due
to the declining availability of affordable rental housing.424
The high level of interest shifted the challenge to securing housing that met the
program requirements.425 There was a large supply of available housing stock due to the
dramatic post-war growth of suburban rental housing.426 However, many of the rental units
did not meet the program’s locational objectives, size needs, or Section 8 quality and cost

416

POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 238–39.
Id. at 241.
418
Id. at 239–40.
419
Id. at 240.
420
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 53. Among those who were even aware of the program,
most had lived their whole life in Chicago’s inner city and could not envision moving to the suburbs—the
program’s favored destination. A 1979 HUD Study of the Gautreaux Program found that only 12% of
eligible families who did not participate desired to live in the suburbs. KATHLEEN A. PEROFF, CLOTEAL L.
DAVIS, & RONALD JONES, GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON
PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS 8, 35–36 (1979).
421
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 54. By the early 1980s, people were lining up on the
streets by the thousands on the specified registration day. When they switched to a phone registration, in
the early 1990s, the telephone company estimated that they received at least ten thousand calls in one day.
Id.; POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 244–45. In another example of Polikoff’s commitment to the program, he
sometimes answered the phones on registration day. Id.
422
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 55. A 1979 HUD study found that 43% of Gautreaux
families said their source of information about the program was a friend or relative. PEROFF, DAVIS, &
JONES, supra note 420, at 123.
423
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 54–55. A 1979 HUD study of the Gautreaux Program
found that 34% of participants judged good schools to be the most important factor in their decision to
move. PEROFF, DAVIS, & JONES, supra note 420, at 105.
424
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 54–55.
425
Id. at 57.
426
Id. at 57–58. For a detailed study about the available housing stock, see PEROFF, DAVIS, & JONES, supra
note 420, at 3, 43–49.
417
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requirements.427 Over time there was enough housing for the program to proceed at a steady
pace, but there was never a large enough increase to surge of families’ interest.428
Additionally, the voluntary participation of landlords was crucial for the program’s
growth.429 While the Leadership Council took numerous steps to attract landlords’
participation in the program, many property owners and managers declined.430 Their
objections seemed to be based on race, class, and composition of the applicant families.431
In addition, some objected to Section 8’s substantive and procedural requirements.432 Thus,
while the program’s reliance on the private market was a strength because there was little
opportunity for local public officials to block it (as in public housing) and the program was
not visible and political, the reliance on the private market also constrained the program’s
growth and success.
IV.

THE RESULTS: MEASURING THE SYNERGY

From 1966 to 1976, the Leadership Council and the Gautreaux lawyers proceeded
independently of each other, pursuing their common goal of enabling Black families to
move on a desegregated basis throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.433 After that, they
continued some of their separate approaches, but they also collaborated on a major new
course of action—the Gautreaux Program.434
The main comparison for testing the synergy hypothesis is between: 1) the impact of
the separate efforts of the Leadership Council’s programs and the Gautreaux court’s
“scattered site” program until 1976; and 2) the scale of the collaborative Gautreaux
Program that started that year. Statistics on the moves facilitated by some initiatives are not
available, but disparities in the order of magnitude are clear.435 The Gautreaux Program

RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 58–59. In 1976, 45% of CHA’s family apartments were
three or more bedrooms. The suburban rental market did not have a similar supply of housing for large
families. Id. at 58, 208-9n48 (citing CHA Facts 1977: Chi. Hous. Auth. Ann. Report 1976 (Chi. Hous.
Auth., 1978), 30). HUD had a maximum rental amount, based on a percentage of “fair market rent.” This
was often limiting in the areas available to the program, especially in suburban counties. BARRY G. JACOBS,
GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 27–28 (Bureau of Nat’l Aff. 1982).
428
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 57.
429
Id. at 59.
430
Id. at 59–61.
431
Id.
432
Id. at 61.
433
See supra Part III.
434
While the Gautreaux Program dominated the new approach, the Illinois Housing Development
Authority supplemented the effort with a much smaller parallel initiative. See supra Part IV. The
Leadership Council continued other activities such as advocacy and public education that did not involve
direct services to home seekers. It is impossible to determine the extent to which they may have had an
indirect impact in bringing about additional moves. See supra Part II.A.2.
435
For example, the Legal Action program filed more than 1,500 lawsuits, with a success rate over 90%.
However, success could mean the family moved into the apartment, or simply received a settlement or
some other positive outcome. Similarly, the cases that did involve a move, may or may not have
specifically involved a low-income Black family moving in to a primarily white neighborhood. White, in
CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 139.
427
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assisted far more moves than all of the two groups’ separate strategies combined.436 Joining
forces therefore produced significant synergy.
A. 1966–1976: A Time of Separate Paths
The Summit Agreement did not provide a specific mandate for the Leadership
Council to provide direct assistance to individual home seekers.437 However, in its first
decade, the Leadership Council carried out some “direct services” programs, assisting
individual families with their moves.438
The Leadership Council’s earliest initiative enlisted real estate brokers to help Black
home seekers move into predominantly white communities.439 The goal was to facilitate
1,000 moves in the first year.440 However, only 46 families moved in that time.441
The agency’s Legal Action Program had far greater success in helping Black families
gain access to areas where they had not been welcome.442 The program enabled dozens of
Black families each year to overcome the discrimination they encountered and move into
housing of their choice.443 By 1976, the Leadership Council facilitated several hundred
moves through the Legal Action Program.444
In early 1976, the Illinois Housing Development Authority provided funding so the
Leadership Council could assist low-income Black families in securing subsidized rents in
state-financed new developments.445 As mentioned earlier, the scale in the precollaboration experimental period was quite modest.446
Meanwhile, on the litigation path, the two parts of the Gautreaux lawsuit had quite
different histories.447 The CHA case reached the remedial stage in 1969.448 As of 1974,
CHA had built no remedial public housing in the five years since the original order.449
CHA finally broke ground for approximately sixty-five units in predominantly white areas

436

See infra Part V.A-B.
See supra note 195–196 and accompanying text.
438
See discussion supra notes 226–228. The Legal Action Program represented many home seekers
alleging racial discrimination. The cases often led to moves, but not necessarily low-income families.
BERRY, supra note 208, at 109–12.
439
BERRY, supra note 208, at 21.
440
Id. at 47.
441
Id. at 61.
442
See supra notes 389–393.
443
Id.
444
See White, in CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT, supra note 13, at 139. The Legal Action program filed
over 1,500 cases, with over a 90% success rate. While success did not always mean a move, certainly
hundreds of moves did occur.
445
See supra notes 379–382 and accompanying text.
446
Also that year, the Home Investment Fund (HIF) merged into the Leadership Council, creating a new
section called the Fair Housing Council. It assisted Black “market rate” home seekers with the financial
aspects of securing their homes. See supra notes 362–80 and accompanying text.
447
See supra Part II.
448
See supra notes 233, 243–244 and accompanying text.
449
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 30. The delay was not attributable to lack of demand or
resources. Thousands of eligible families expressed interest in the program. HUD set aside funding for an
initial 1,500 family units in Chicago in 1969. Id. at 27. Of course, construction and acquisition and
rehabilitation take longer than moving into existing housing, the main focus of the Gautreaux Program, but
that difference cannot begin to explain the order of magnitude disparities.
437
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in 1975.450 In the first thirty years of this extraordinarily lengthy case, construction and
acquisition of scattered site public housing totaled 2,700 units.451 CHA provided only about
900 apartments in the two decades prior to the judge appointing a receiver.452 The Habitat
Corporation, the receiver that the district judge appointed in 1987 to administer the
program, built or acquired and rehabilitated about 1,800 units in its first decade.453 That
amount was double the number CHA had provided in almost two decades.454 The receiver’s
competence and commitment enabled it to increase the pace, but the earlier delays
prevented a major breakthrough because they reduced the amount of affordable land
available for the program.455 Moreover, none of the suburban officials ever agreed to work
with CHA, so the suburban option produced no housing opportunities for Gautreaux
families.456
In the HUD part of the litigation, there were no moves before 1976.457 It took a
decade to secure the Supreme Court decision that defined the parameters of permissible
relief.458 That decision laid the groundwork for the transition from separate paths to the
collaboration that produced the Gautreaux Program.459
B. 1976–1998: A Time of Collaboration
The Gautreaux Program represented the core of the collaboration. The IHDA-funded
initiative that began early in 1976 provided additional metropolitan-wide housing
opportunities.460
The Gautreaux Program started slowly.461 In the first fifteen months, the Leadership
Council helped to move 168 families, well short of its one-year goal of 400 families.462
With experience and improvements in the program, the pace increased.463 After the district
court’s 1981 consent decree established an obligation of 7,100 family moves, annual
placements averaged about 300 families.464 The moves jumped into the 400s in the
450

Id. at 30. The original order required that the first 700 units be located in predominantly white areas.
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969)).
451
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 212.
452
Id. at 212–13.
453
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 33.
454
Id.
455
By that time there had been massive residential development on much of the once available land. Id. at
34–35. Other constraints included delays in getting rezoning and construction approvals, federal
regulations, limited federal funds, and community opposition. By the end of Habitat’s first decade as
receiver, it was clear that the future prospects for developing scattered site housing in predominantly white
neighborhoods were quite limited. See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 213.
456
Id. at 95–96, 110, 140.
457
The case was still going through the court system, no action was occurring. See supra Part II.B.2.
458
Id.; Hills v. Gautreaux, 435 U.S. 284 (1976).
459
That includes the smaller IHDA program, as well. See supra notes 379–382 and accompanying text.
460
See supra notes 379–382 and accompanying text.
461
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 50.
462
Id.
463
Id. at 67.
464
Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1981); RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note
15, at 67.
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1990s.465 By early 1998, when the Leadership Council enrolled its last family, 6,500
families had moved through the Gautreaux Program.466
Moreover, what began as a modest, short-term experiment of moving Gautreaux
families into IHDA financed projects in the city and suburbs evolved into a significant
ongoing supplement to the Gautreaux Program.467 In the one-year experiment, forty-four
Gautreaux families moved into IHDA projects with their Section 8 vouchers.468 That set
the stage for a parallel effort to the Gautreaux Program. In the next two decades, 1,500
Gautreaux families rented apartments in those projects.469 That was not nearly the scale of
the Gautreaux Program, but it increased the overall pace of families’ moves.470 By 1998,
the Gautreaux Program, combined with the IHDA-funded initiative, reached (and
exceeded) the obligation of assisting 7,100 Gautreaux families to move throughout the
Chicago metropolitan area.471
On an annual basis, far more families moved through the new initiatives starting in
1976 than through the sum of the individual ones prior to that time.472 The combination of
the availability of Section 8 rent subsidies, the lawyers securing a favorable Supreme Court
decision on the metropolitan question, HUD’s willingness to negotiate a new housing
program, and the Leadership Council’s competence and commitment produced an upsurge
in families moving that far exceeded the earlier moves.473
In his extremely detailed account of the case, lead counsel Polikoff gave overall
ratings to the scattered site and Gautreaux programs.474 On the former, in an expression of
extreme frustration with CHA’s non-performance, he said that on a scale of one to ten, “the
scattered site part of the Gautreaux remedy would have to be judged as falling somewhere
below zero.”475 The subsequent work of the court-appointed receiver brought his score for

465

RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 67.
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 248.
467
Id. at 229, 248.
468
Id. at 229.
469
Id. at 248.
470
Id. at 232, 248.
471
Id. at xiv; Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 669; RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at
67. By early 1998, when the Leadership Council enrolled its last families, about 6,500 families had moved
through the Gautreaux Program. The rest of the 7,100 families specified in the consent decree were assisted
through other initiatives. More than half the families—about 4,000—in the Gautreaux Program moved to
the suburbs.
466

As suggested in the text, the total moves actually exceeded the 7,100 target, reaching around 8,000
families. That included 6,500 families through the Gautreaux Program and 1,500 through the Leadership
Council’s IHDA-funded effort. POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 48.
472
See discussion supra Part V.A.
473
The litigation, with its favorable Supreme Court decision, and the social movement’s capable and
committed successor organization, came together to produce an important synergy. That is the case even
though it was a decade in coming, and that it cannot be quantified precisely.
474
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 212–14, 248.
475
Id. at 212. He made that statement in 1986, eighteen months before the Habitat Company took over as
receiver and picked up the pace.
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the scattered site initiative up to two or three.476 In contrast, Polikoff gave the Gautreaux
Program a score of six or seven.477
Those ratings mirror the comparisons above. Translated into the terms of the
argument here, the collaboration advanced the organizations’ goals far more effectively
than either organization had achieved working separately.
CONCLUSION
The Montgomery Bus Boycott is considered the paradigm of the way that litigation
and direct action can combine to produce synergy in social change. This quintessential
example indicates that the two strategies may need to be deployed together within a narrow
time frame.478 Additionally, experience gleaned from the boycott suggested that a single
organization needed to be in charge of strategic decision-making.479
Challenges in Chicago to housing discrimination in the last third of the twentieth
century suggest that the potential for synergy exists even with different time frames and
organizational structures. In this case, the argument requires understanding social
movements as having impacts potentially extending well beyond their direct action
campaign. For example, the history of combatting housing discrimination in Chicago
suggests that the Summit Agreement ending the Chicago Freedom Movement’s open
housing demonstrations defined its long-term impact by providing for the creation of a
successor organization to implement it.
The Gautreaux lawyers and the Leadership Council pursued their housing goals
independently for a decade, with separate organizations in charge.480 In a move that could
not have been anticipated at the outset, they joined forces in 1976.481 They worked together
to design and implement a program to advance their shared objectives.482 That initiative,
aided by the resources of a new housing subsidy program and the opportunity to operate
on a metropolitan-wide scale, made possible an initiative that produced far greater results
than both of them acting independently had been able to bring about up until that time—
the very definition of synergy.483
Without the Chicago Freedom Movement and the Leadership Council that it
spawned, the Gautreaux lawyers would not have been able to engage an established
organization with the capacity to carry out their innovative program.484 In turn, without the
476

Id. at 214. Note that it required the court taking the extraordinary step of appointing a receiver to take
over CHA’s responsibilities to get his assessment into positive territory and to achieve a scale and level of
desegregation that was anywhere near what was achieved in the jointly created and implemented Gautreaux
Program. Habitat accomplished more in its first decade as receiver than CHA had in almost two decades.
RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 15, at 33. “With Habitat taking over as receiver, the administrative
picture changed significantly and the pace increased; but the Gautreaux Program’s assets permitted it to
continue outpacing the scattered site program.” Id. at 69.
477
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 248.
478
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 663.
479
See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
480
See supra Part V.A.
481
See supra Part III.C.
482
Id.
483
See supra Part V.
484
See supra note 384.
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opportunities created by the litigation, the Leadership Council would not have had the
resources and other forms of support to carry out anything more than its modest efforts in
assisting movers.485
In the process, a variation on the paradigm of the Montgomery coordination of social
change strategies emerged. While social movements and related litigation might start on
separate tracks or with separate organizations in charge, and may continue in that vein for
an extended period, the possibility of “delayed synergy” remains indefinitely.
AFTERMATH: A NOTE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF HOUSING “MOBILITY PROGRAMS” AND
PUBLIC HOUSING DESEGREGATION LITIGATION
The Gautreaux Program, the centerpiece of the Chicago story, spawned numerous
similar initiatives around the country. They came to be called “residential mobility
programs,” or simply “mobility programs.”486
In 1989, Gautreaux lead counsel Alex Polikoff began an effort to persuade the
federal government to replicate the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program in other cities.487
Polikoff’s initial correspondence supported his proposal with information about the
Gautreaux Program, the research on its beneficial effects for participating families, and a
favorable op-ed piece.488 This effort began his persistent and prolonged letter-writing
campaign, punctuated by long periods of silence, followed by intermittent unenthusiastic
responses from various HUD officials.489
Finally, HUD agreed that it would not oppose a legislative proposal so long as it was
introduced by a member of Congress, rather than HUD, and that the program was based on
poverty rather than race.490 Polikoff found a supportive Senator, and in 1991, funding was
provided for a program to be called Moving to Opportunity (MTO).491 The program was
carried out in five selected cities, with an emphasis on research and evaluation related to
485

See supra Part V.
See POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 246–47.
487
Id. at 258–63. Incoming HUD Secretary Jack Kemp said that he intended to push for “bold, radical and
experimental programs” to address problems of the inner city, so it seemed like a window of opportunity to
try to persuade HUD to add this approach to its requests for Congressional funding. Polikoff worked with
Kale Williams of the Leadership Council and Northwestern University Professor James Rosenbaum, who
had carried out extensive research on families’ experience in the Gautreaux Program, to move the process
along. E.g., Susan J. Popkin, James E. Rosenbaum & Pamela M. Meaden, Labor Market Experiences of
Low-Income Black Women in Middle-Class Suburbs: Evidence from a Survey of Gautreaux Program
Participants, 12 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 556, 573 (1993); James E. Rosenbaum, Stefanie DeLuca &
Anita Zuberi, When does residential mobility benefit low-income families? Evidence from recent housing
voucher programmes, 17 J. POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 113, 113–24 (2009). See generally RUBINOWITZ &
ROSENBAUM, supra note 15.
488
Chicago's Housing Pioneers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at A30. See, e.g., Popkin, Rosenbaum &
Meaden, supra note 487; Rosenbaum, DeLuca & Zuberi, supra note 487.
489
POLIKOFF, supra note 15, at 258–61.
490
Families’ eligibility had to be based on poverty rather than race, and destinations had to be “lowpoverty” areas. HUD made a staffer available to work with Polikoff to make sure the specifics of a
proposed program would be acceptable to the agency. Id. at 261.
491
Polikoff used a contact to promote the idea with Maryland Senator Barbara Mikulski, head of the Senate
Committee responsible for HUD appropriations, Federal funding included an allocation of Section 8 rental
subsidies and the cost of administering the programs. Id. at 262–64; Dep’ts of Veterans Aff. & HUD &
Indep. Agencies Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-139, 105 Stat. 736, 745 (1991).
486
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the families’ experience as a key part of its purpose.492 MTO was based on the Gautreaux
Program model, but it used poverty rather than race in defining eligibility and specified
appropriate destinations for moves as low-poverty areas.493
In the wake of MTO, local programs proliferated around the country.494 A 2020
report noted the rapid expansion of these initiatives and identified fifteen existing mobility
programs and ten “new and emerging programs” in cities across the country.495
Partnerships between local public housing agencies and non-profit organizations assisted
low-income families to move to “higher opportunity areas.”496 The programs’ assistance
included mobility counseling, assistance in the housing search, and enlisting landlord
participation.497
Congress itself provided more evidence that the idea of housing mobility is generally
accepted as a solution for alleviating housing discrimination.498 In the highly partisan times
of 2019 and 2020, Congress passed two bipartisan bills appropriating a total of $50 million
for a housing choice voucher mobility program.499 The HUD announcement of the program
cited studies demonstrating the benefits of the MTO programs funded in 1991, and referred
to Polikoff’s advocacy in bringing about the mobility idea.500 As such, the collaboration
between the Leadership Council and the Gautreaux lawyers not only produced synergy in
Chicago, it also affected the entire country, with growing evidence of the long-term
benefits for the children moving to more middle-class neighborhoods.501 Children who
moved to such neighborhoods, especially at an early age, had higher college attendance
rates, higher earnings, live in better neighborhoods as adults, and are less likely to be single
parents.502

492

Id. The MTO cities were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.
105 Stat. at 745, supra note 491; see supra note 492.
494
In a Seattle mobility program, researchers found significant benefits for children participating. Raj
Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106(4) AM. ECON. REV. 855, 855–
902 (2016); Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Effects of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility
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